State v.O'Driscoll The police officer s errors in the reading of the standard statement informing defendant of the consequences of refusing to provide a breath sample were not material in light of the statutory purpose to inform motorists and impel compliance
State v.O'Driscoll (A-7-12) (070438)
Argued May 13, 2013 -- Decided September 18, 2013
RABNER, C.J., writing for a unanimous Court.
In this case, in which defendant was convicted of driving while intoxicated (DWI) and refusal to provide a sample of his breath, the Court considers whether errors in the reading of the standard statement informing defendant of the consequences of refusal warrant a reversal of defendant s conviction for that offense.
Defendant was placed under arrest and taken to police headquarters. After observing defendant for twenty minutes, the officer asked him to submit to a breath test. The officer read from the January 21, 2004 version of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission Standard Statement for Operators of a Motor Vehicle, informing defendant of the consequences of refusal. The statement that the officer read was outdated. The standard statement had been revised as of April 26, 2004, and the penalties differed from the version the officer read in three ways: the minimum period for revocation of one s license was seven months, not six; the minimum fine was $300, not $250; and the maximum fine was $2000, not $1000. In response to the final question of the standard statement, defendant replied, in slurred speech, I don t know what to do. The officer then read defendant a supplemental statement from the standard form, followed by Miranda warnings. Shortly after, defendant noted that he was taking a number of medications and had last taken Ambien at 11:30 p.m. the prior evening about an hour before his arrest.
Defendant was charged with DWI, refusal to submit to a breath test, reckless driving, failure to drive on the right side of the roadway, and possessing an open container of alcohol in a motor vehicle. Defendant was convicted of the failure to keep right, open container, and DWI charges. The municipal court judge also convicted defendant of refusal. Although the judge noted that the officer read an outdated version of the standard statement, the judge found the differences very immaterial and concluded that they would not have made any difference to the defendant on that evening. Fines, costs, and assessments were imposed, as well as a three-month license suspension on the DWI charge. On the refusal charge, the judge ordered a consecutive, seven-month license suspension, a $306 fine, $33 in court costs, and a $100 DWI surcharge.
Defendant appealed only the DWI, refusal, and open container convictions. After a trial de novo in the Law Division, the court found defendant guilty of all three charges. With regard to the refusal charge, the Law Division judge found that the inconsistencies in the outdated standard statement were de minimis and immaterial. He also noted that the doctrine of substantial compliance applied. In addition, the court rejected defendant s Ambien defense.
Defendant appealed. In an unpublished opinion, a two-judge panel of the Appellate Division affirmed the DWI and open container convictions but reversed the conviction for refusal. The panel found it highly doubtful that defendant would have been more likely to feel impelled to give a breath sample had he been read the correct penalties from the April 2004 form. The panel, however, concluded that because the Standard Statement read to defendant . . . provided inaccurate information about the penalties he faced, the statement did not satisfy the statutory mandate to inform defendant of the consequences of refusal. Relying in part on State v. Marquez, 202 N.J. 485 (2010), the appellate panel concluded that the State had failed to inform defendant of the consequences of refusal and felt constrained to reverse defendant s refusal conviction.
The Supreme Court granted the State s petition for certification, which addressed the refusal conviction. 212 N.J. 199 (2012).
HELD: The police officer s errors in the reading of the standard statement informing defendant of the consequences of refusing to provide a breath sample were not material in light of the statutory purpose to inform motorists and impel compliance. The officer s misstatements could not have reasonably affected defendant s choice to refuse to provide a breath sample, and do not require reversal of defendant s conviction for refusal.
1. Marquez, supra, explained how the implied consent and refusal statutes interact: the refusal statute requires officers to request motor vehicle operators to submit to a breath test; the implied consent statute tells officers how to make that request. 202 N.J. at 501. Marquez noted that officers are to read the standard statement to inform defendants of the consequences of refusal. Justice LaVecchia, dissenting in part, concluded that courts need only determine whether the officer made objectively reasonable efforts to inform the defendant under the circumstances. Id. at 524. Neither the majority nor the dissent required that the standard statement be recited perfectly or even addressed the question. The language of the implied consent statute also does not require absolute precision. To be sure, police officers are expected to read the correct statement in its entirety and not deviate from it. But if an officer misreads part of the statement, reversal of a refusal conviction is not necessarily required. Instead, the Court considers whether the error is material in light of the statutory purpose to inform motorists and impel compliance. The same type of analysis one that focuses on whether the State has informed the defendant of material facts should apply when a police officer reads the wrong version of the standard statement or misreads the current form. Under that approach, discrepancies that would not have influenced a reasonable driver s choice to submit to a breath test would not be considered material and would not require reversal of a conviction for refusal. (pp. 15-21)
2. The officer s mistakes in this case were inconsequential. As the Legislature intended, the officer used the standard statement to inform defendant of the consequences of refusal in a manner that should have impelled a reasonable person to comply. It is difficult to see how the minor discrepancies in this case could have influenced that decision. Because the errors were not material, the Court finds that the State satisfied the elements of the refusal statute. In addition, the sentence imposed both the amount of time of the license suspension and the fine fell within the ranges the officer identified. (pp. 21-23)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED, and defendant s conviction for refusal is REINSTATED.
JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, HOENS and PATTERSON and JUDGES RODR GUEZ and CUFF (both temporarily assigned) join in CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER s opinion.
