Police use of GPS device on car violates 4th Amendment United State v Jones

Police use of GPS device on car violates 4^th Amendment

United State v Jones __ US ___

January 23, 2012 No. 10–1259.

The Government’s attachment of the GPS device to the vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.

(a) The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Here, the Government’s physical intrusion on an “effect” for the purpose of obtaining information constitutes a “search.” This type of encroachment on an area enumerated in the Amendment would have been considered a search within the meaning of the Amendment at the time it was adopted.

(b) This conclusion is consistent with this Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which until the latter half of the 20th century was tied to common-law trespass. Later cases, which have deviated from that exclusively property-based approach, have applied the analysis of Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, which said that the Fourth Amendment protects a person’s “reasonable expectation of privacy,” id., at 360. Here, the Court need not address the Government’s contention that Jones had no “reasonable expectation of privacy,” because Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation. At bottom, the Court must “assure preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. 27. Katz did not repudiate the understanding that the Fourth Amendment embodies a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas it enumerates. The Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, but not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165; Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U. S. 56. United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276, and United States v. Karo, 468 U. S. 705—post-Katz cases rejecting Fourth Amendment challenges to “beepers,” electronic tracking devices representing another form of electronic monitoring—do not foreclose the conclusion that a search occurred here. New York v. Class, 475 U. S. 106, and Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S. 170, also do not support the Government’s position.

Objection to lab report starts after all reports provided. State v. Heisler

Objection to lab report starts after all reports provided. State v. Heisler __ NJ Super. __ A 6281-08T4

The court held that the ten-day period in which a defendant must object to the admission into evidence of a lab certificate, or else waive his right to confront the laboratory analyst, begins to run only after the State has provided "all reports relating to the analysis in question." N.J.S.A. 2C:35-19. The court resolved ambiguity in the statute that requires the State to serve its notice of intent to use a lab certificate and supporting data twenty days before trial, but requires a defendant to object within ten days of receiving only the notice of intent. As the defendant's objection was timely under our statutory construction, we reversed his convictions for being under the influence of CDS, and operating a vehicle while knowingly having CDS in his possession or in the vehicle.

Error by police dispatcher in invalid arrest warrant requires suppression of evidence under NJ Constitution. State v. Handy 206 NJ 39 (2011)

Error by police dispatcher in invalid arrest warrant requires suppression of evidence under NJ Constitution. State v. Handy 206 NJ 39 (2011)

The dispatcher’s conduct – advising an officer on the scene that there was an outstanding warrant when the warrant contained a differently spelled name and a different date of birth – was objectively unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7, of the New Jersey Constitution. Evidence uncovered during the search incident to the arrest must be suppressed.

Officer not always permitted to render opinion. State v. McLean 205 NJ 438 (2011)

Officer not always permitted to render opinion. State v. McLean 205 NJ 438 (2011)

The opinion offered by the officer does not meet the requirements needed to qualify it as a lay opinion and permitting the officer to testify about his opinion invaded the fact-finding province of the jury. This case involved a drug dealing conviction where a detective, after testifying about transactions seen from an unmarked car while on undercover drug surveillance, opined that they were narcotics sale.

Personal Use Does not Permit Growing Medical Marijuana. State v. Wilson 421 NJ Super 301 (App. Div. 2011)

Personal Use Does not Permit Growing Medical Marijuana. State v. Wilson 421 NJ Super 301 (App. Div. 2011)

The principal issue in this is case is whether the personal use defense for manufacturing a controlled dangerous substance, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-2, applies to the growing of marijuana under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5. After reviewing the relevant statutory language, as well as the purpose for the personal use exemption, we affirm the trial court's determination that there is no personal use exemption for growing marijuana.

Police did not Require Warrant for Cell Phone Site. State v. Earls 420 NJ Super. 583 (App. Div. 2011)

Police did not Require Warrant for Cell Phone Site. State v. Earls 420 NJ Super. 583 (App. Div. 2011)

The use of cell phone site information, obtained by the police without a warrant from a suspect's cell phone provider to determine his general location, does not violate the Fourth Amendment or its counterpart in the New Jersey Constitution because a person has no constitutionally protected right of privacy in his general location on roadways or other public places.