2053 Woodbridge Ave. Edison, NJ 08817

Ken is a NJ trial attorney who has published 130 articles in national and New Jersey publications on litigation topics. He has been selected to write the new ABA book: DUI and Drug Possession Defense".

Wednesday, May 30, 2018

Legal Secretary Help Wanted

Monday-Friday 9 A.M. - 2:30 P.M.
DAILY DUTIES -Telephone Answering -Dictaphone and typing on Computer - Preparation of Wills, Complaints and legal documents on Computer -General Office duties in Law Office and  personal injury -Update mailing/ client lists and  marketing -All other legal secretary duties required by office to assist our valuable clients Personal Injury / Civil Litigation Assignments    Must be able to: Draft, Prepare and File Personal Injury, Complaints, Motions     Prepare Summons and Forward for Service    Draft Plaintiff Answer to Interrogatories    Request Hospital Reports, Medical Records, Doctor¹s Reports    Supplement Interrogatories    Schedule Depositions    Prepare Arbitration Statements    Answer   Client Questions and Make Them Happy    Serve Discovery Requests on Adversaries
CRIMINAL / MUNICIPAL COURT    Must be able to: Prepare Retainer Statements Prepare Discovery Letter to Prosecutor & Letter of Representation to Court Prepare Motion To Suppress & Other Criminal Motions Prepare Defense by Affidavit Speak with Potential Clients of the Phone Do whatever is needed to win / resolve cases for Clients.
WILLS, ELDER LAW & PROBATE    Must be able to: Prepare Wills & Forward to Clients for review.    Prepare Power Of Attorney & Forward to Clients for review.    Prepare Living Will & Forward to Clients for review.    Make revisions to client documents based on their wishes.     Attend to Execution / Signature of Documents      Must be dependable and committed to perfection.     Call Law Office of Kenneth Vercammen & Associates  2053 Woodbridge Ave., Edison 732-572-0500 Great for moms not able to work full time and for experienced legal secretaries who no longer want to be forced to work mandatory overtime and nights.     Are you hardworking and aggressive?  Check out our website at KennethVercammen.com to see what we are about.
   Fax or mail a resume with request for  an appointment for Legal Secretary position if qualified - 732-572-0030 fax   $14.00 per hour if able to handle Personal Injury Responsibilities Must have 3 years prior New Jersey Legal Secretary   Law Office Experience _________________
Partial list of benefits for part time new staff
1.)  You may attend all seminars/ lectures by Ken Vercammen free of charge. Please leave a note ahead of time.
2.)  We will also pay for you to attend ICLE (Institute for Continuing Legal Education).  Seminars and Bar Seminars on legal areas we handle.
3.)  Paid holidays start 6 months after you start.
4.)  Free consultations to your family and friends.
5.)  Free Wills, Power of Attorney, Living Wills, Middlesex County Traffic Tickets and other flat rate legal matters for you and for your family.
6.)  1 week vacation provided one year after beginning of employment.
7.)  Retirement plan - additional 10% of annual salary paid by KAV into your retirement plan after 3 years. You do not have to contribute. Therefore, if part time salary is $20,000, we will contribute/ pay $2,000 into a retirement plan via Morgan Stanley Dean Witter for you
8.)  Please refer cases to the office.  If you want business cards printed with your name, leave a note for Ken Vercammen and they will be provided free of charge.
9 Staff & Law Clerk Group Lunches provided on periodic basis
10.  Christmas bonus  awarded to top staff for outstanding service                          [rev Brendan Imac 4/29/03]

Tuesday, May 29, 2018

Arrested for DUI?

Arrested for DUI?
Kenneth Vercammen's Law office represents individuals charged with criminal and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey. Our office helps people with traffic/municipal court tickets throughout New Jersey, including drivers charged with DUI/DWI and refusal. Driving Under Influence and other Motor vehicle violations can cost you. You will have to pay fines in court, or receive points on your driver's license. A conviction will require you to pay expensive surcharges to the N.J. MVC [Division of Motor Vehicles] and have your license suspended. In New Jersey, the Judge does not have to rule that you were drunk. The prosecutor only needs to prove a driver was under the influence of alcohol. Don't give up! The Law Office of Kenneth Vercammen offers information and can provide experienced attorney representation for Driving Under Influence and other Motor vehicle violations. When your driver's license is in jeopardy, or you are facing thousands of dollars in fines, DMV surcharges and car insurance increases, you need excellent legal representation. The least expensive attorney is not always the answer. Please schedule an appointment if you need experienced legal representation in a traffic/municipal court matter. Our website njlaws.com provides information on traffic offenses of which we can be retained to represent people. Our website also provides details on jail terms for Driving Under Influence and car insurance eligibility points. Car insurance companies increase rates or drop customers based on moving violations.
In New Jersey Driving Under Influence (DUI) and Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) are the same charge. The following is the new DWI law in New Jersey with all of its amendments:
N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 Driving While Intoxicated
39:4-50. (a) Except as provided in subsection (g) of this section, a person who operates a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug, or operates a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08% or more by weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood or permits another person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug to operate a motor vehicle owned by him or in his custody or control or permits another to operate a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08% or more by weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood shall be subject: (1) For the first offense: (i) if the person's blood alcohol concentration is 0.08% or higher but less than 0.10%, or the person operates a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, or the or more of the following chemical compounds: acetone and acetate, amyl nitrite or amyl nitrate or their isomers, benzene, butyl alcohol, butyl nitrite, butyl nitrate or their isomers, ethyl acetate, ethyl alcohol, ethyl nitrite or ethyl nitrate, ethylene dichloride, isobutyl alcohol or isopropyl alcohol, methyl alcohol, methyl ethyl ketone, nitrous oxide, n-propyl alcohol, pentachlorophenol, petroleum ether, propyl nitrite or propyl nitrate or their isomers, toluene, toluol or xylene or any other chemical substance capable of causing a condition of intoxication, inebriation, excitement, stupefaction or the dulling of the brain or nervous system as a result of the inhalation of the fumes or vapors of such chemical substance. Whenever an operator of a motor vehicle has been involved in an accident resulting in death, bodily injury or property damage, a police officer shall consider that fact along with all other facts and circumstances in determining whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that person was operating a motor vehicle in violation of this section. A conviction of a violation of a law of a substantially similar nature in another jurisdiction, regardless of whether that jurisdiction is a signatory to the Interstate Driver License Compact pursuant to P.L. 1966, c.73 (C. 39: 5D-1 et seq.), shall constitute a prior conviction under this subsection unless the defendant can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the conviction in the other jurisdiction was based exclusively upon a violation of a proscribed blood alcohol concentration of less than 0.08%.
If the driving privilege of any person is under revocation or suspension for a violation of any provision of this Title or Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes at the time of any conviction for a violation of this section, the revocation or suspension period imposed shall commence as of the date of termination of the existing revocation or suspension period. In the case of any person who at the time of the imposition of sentence is less than 17 years of age, the forfeiture, suspension or revocation of the driving privilege imposed by the court under this section shall commence immediately, run through the offender's seventeenth birthday and continue from that date for the period set by the court pursuant to paragraphs (1) through (3) of this subsection. A court that imposes a term of imprisonment for a first or second offense under this section may sentence the person so convicted to the county jail, to the workhouse of the county wherein the offense was committed, to an inpatient rehabilitation program or to an Intoxicated Driver Resource Center or other facility approved by the chief of the Intoxicated Driving Program Unit in the Department of Health and Senior Services. For a third or subsequent offense a person shall not serve a term of imprisonment at an Intoxicated Driver Resource Center as provided in subsection (f). A person who has been convicted of a previous violation of this section need not be charged as a second or subsequent offender in the complaint made against him in order to render him liable to the punishment imposed by this section on a second or subsequent offender, but if the second offense occurs more than 10 years after the first offense, the court shall treat the second conviction as a first offense for sentencing purposes and if a third offense occurs more than 10 years after the second offense, the court shall treat the third conviction as a second offense for sentencing purposes. (b) A person convicted under this section must satisfy the screening, evaluation, referral, program and fee requirements of the Division of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse's Intoxicated Driving Program Unit, and of the Intoxicated Driver Resource Centers and a program of alcohol and drug education and highway safety, as prescribed by the chief administrator. The sentencing court shall inform the person convicted that failure to satisfy such requirements shall result in a mandatory two-day term of imprisonment in a county jail and a driver license revocation or suspension and continuation of revocation or suspension until such requirements are satisfied, unless stayed by court order in accordance with the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey, or R.S. 39:5-22. Upon sentencing, the court shall forward to the Division of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse's Intoxicated Driving Program Unit a copy of a person's conviction record. A fee of $100.00 shall be payable to the Alcohol Education, Rehabilitation and Enforcement Fund established pursuant to section 3 of P.L. 1983, c.531 (C. 26: 2B-32) to support the Intoxicated Driving Program Unit. (c) Upon conviction of a violation of this section, the court shall collect forthwith the New Jersey driver's license or licenses of the person so convicted and forward such license or licenses to the chief administrator. The court shall inform the person convicted that if he is convicted of personally operating a motor vehicle during the period of license suspension imposed pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, he shall, upon conviction, be subject to the penalties established in R.S. 39:3-40. The person convicted shall be informed orally and in writing. A person shall be required to acknowledge receipt of that written notice in writing. Failure to receive a written notice or failure to acknowledge in writing the receipt of a written notice shall not be a defense to a subsequent charge of a violation of R.S. 39:3-40. In the event that a person convicted under this section is the holder of any out-of-State driver's license, the court shall not collect the license but shall notify forthwith the chief administrator, who shall, in turn, notify appropriate officials in the licensing jurisdiction. The court shall, however, revoke the nonresident's driving privilege to operate a motor vehicle in this State, in accordance with this section. Upon conviction of a violation of this section, the court shall notify the person convicted, orally and in writing, of the penalties for a second, third or subsequent violation of this section. A person shall be required to acknowledge receipt of that written notice in writing. Failure to receive a written notice or failure to acknowledge in writing the receipt of a written notice shall not be a defense to a subsequent charge of a violation of this section. (d) The chief administrator shall promulgate rules and regulations pursuant to the "Administrative Procedure Act," P.L. 1968, c.410 (C. 52: 14B-1 et seq.) in order to establish a program of alcohol education and highway safety, as prescribed by this act. (e) Any person accused of a violation of this section who is liable to punishment imposed by this section as a second or subsequent offender shall be entitled to the same rights of discovery as allowed defendants pursuant to the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey. (f) The counties, in cooperation with the Division of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse and the commission, but subject to the approval of the Division of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse, shall designate and establish on a county or regional basis Intoxicated Driver Resource Centers. These centers shall have the capability of serving as community treatment referral centers and as court monitors of a person's compliance with the ordered treatment, service alternative or community service. All centers established pursuant to this subsection shall be administered by a counselor certified by the Alcohol and Drug Counselor Certification Board of New Jersey or other professional with a minimum of five years experience in the treatment of alcoholism. All centers shall be required to develop individualized treatment plans for all persons attending the centers; provided that the duration of any ordered treatment or referral shall not exceed one year. It shall be the center's responsibility to establish networks with the community alcohol and drug education, treatment and rehabilitation resources and to receive monthly reports from the referral agencies regarding a person's participation and compliance with the program. Nothing in this subsection shall bar these centers from developing their own education and treatment programs; provided that they are approved by the Division of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse. Upon a person's failure to report to the initial screening or any subsequent ordered referral, the Intoxicated Driver Resource Center shall promptly notify the sentencing court of the person's failure to comply. Required detention periods at the Intoxicated Driver Resource Centers shall be determined according to the individual treatment classification assigned by the Intoxicated Driving Program Unit. Upon attendance at an Intoxicated Driver Resource Center, a person shall be required to pay a per diem fee of $75.00 for the first offender program or a per diem fee of $100.00 for the second offender program, as appropriate. Any increases in the per diem fees after the first full year shall be determined pursuant to rules and regulations adopted by the person permits another person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor to operate a motor vehicle owned by him or in his custody or control or permits another person with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08% or higher but less than 0.10% to operate a motor vehicle, to a fine of not less than $250 nor more than $400 and a period of detainment of not less than 12 hours nor more than 48 hours spent during two consecutive days of not less than six hours each day and served as prescribed by the program requirements of the Intoxicated Driver Resource Centers established under subsection (f) of this section and, in the discretion of the court, a term of imprisonment of not more than 30 days and shall forthwith forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for a period of three months; (ii) if the person's blood alcohol concentration is 0.10% or higher, or the person operates a motor vehicle while under the influence of narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug, or the person permits another person who is under the influence of narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug to operate a motor vehicle owned by him or in his custody or control, or permits another person with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10% or more to operate a motor vehicle, to a fine of not less than $300 nor more than $500 and a period of detainment of not less than 12 hours nor more than 48 hours spent during two consecutive days of not less than six hours each day and served as prescribed by the program requirements of the Intoxicated Driver Resource Centers established under subsection (f) of this section and, in the discretion of the court, a term of imprisonment of not more than 30 days and shall forthwith forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for a period of not less than seven months nor more than one year; (iii) For a first offense, a person also shall be subject to the provisions of P.L. 1999, c.417 (C.39:4-50.16 et al.).
(2) For a second violation, a person shall be subject to a fine of not less than $500.00 nor more than $1,000.00, and shall be ordered by the court to perform community service for a period of 30 days, which shall be of such form and on such terms as the court shall deem appropriate under the circumstances, and shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of not less than 48 consecutive hours, which shall not be suspended or served on probation, nor more than 90 days, and shall forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for a period of two years upon conviction, and, after the expiration of said period, he may make application to the Chief Administrator of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission for a license to operate a motor vehicle, which application may be granted at the discretion of the chief administrator, consistent with subsection (b) of this section. For a second violation, a person also shall be required to install an ignition interlock device under the provisions of P.L. 1999, c.417 (C.39:4-50.16 et al.) or shall have his registration certificate and registration plates revoked for two years under the provisions of section 2 of P.L. 1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1).
(3) For a third or subsequent violation, a person shall be subject to a fine of $1,000.00, and shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of not less than 180 days in a county jail or workhouse, except that the court may lower such term for each day, not exceeding 90 days, served participating in a drug or alcohol inpatient rehabilitation program approved by the Intoxicated Driver Resource Center and shall thereafter forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for 10 years. For a third or subsequent violation, a person also shall be required to install an ignition interlock device under the provisions of P.L. 1999, c.417 (C.39:4-50.16 et al.) or shall have his registration certificate and registration plates revoked for 10 years under the provisions of section 2 of P.L. 1995, c.286 (C.39:3-40.1). As used in this section, the phrase "narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug" includes an inhalant or other substance containing a chemical capable of releasing any toxic vapors or fumes for the purpose of inducing a condition of intoxication, such as any glue, cement or any other substance containing one Commissioner of Health and Senior Services in consultation with the Governor's Council on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse pursuant to the "Administrative Procedure Act," P.L. 1968, c.410 (C. 52: 14B-1 et seq.). The centers shall conduct a program of alcohol and drug education and highway safety, as prescribed by the chief administrator. The Commissioner of Health and Senior Services shall adopt rules and regulations pursuant to the "Administrative Procedure Act," P.L. 1968, c.410 (C. 52: 14B-1 et seq.), in order to effectuate the purposes of this subsection. (g) When a violation of this section occurs while: (1) on any school property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board, or within 1,000 feet of such school property; (2) driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S. 39:1-1 if the municipality, by ordinance or resolution, has designated the school crossing as such; or (3) driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S. 39:1-1 knowing that juveniles are present if the municipality has not designated the school crossing as such by ordinance or resolution, the convicted person shall: for a first offense, be fined not less than $500 or more than $800, be imprisoned for not more than 60 days and have his license to operate a motor vehicle suspended for a period of not less than one year or more than two years; for a second offense, be fined not less than $1,000 or more than $2,000, perform community service for a period of 60 days, be imprisoned for not less than 96 consecutive hours, which shall not be suspended or served on probation, nor more than 180 days, except that the court may lower such term for each day, not exceeding 90 days, served performing community service in such form and on such terms as the court shall deem appropriate under the circumstances and have his license to operate a motor vehicle suspended for a period of not less than four years; and, for a third offense, be fined $2,000, imprisoned for 180 days in a county jail or workhouse, except that the court may lower such term for each day, not exceeding 90 days, served participating in a drug or alcohol inpatient rehabilitation program approved by the Intoxicated Driver Resource Center, and have his license to operate a motor vehicle suspended for a period of 20 years; the period of license suspension shall commence upon the completion of any prison sentence imposed upon that person. A map or true copy of a map depicting the location and boundaries of the area on or within 1,000 feet of any property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board produced pursuant to section 1 of P.L. 1987, c.101 (C. 2C:35-7) may be used in a prosecution under paragraph (1) of this subsection. It shall not be relevant to the imposition of sentence pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection that the defendant was unaware that the prohibited conduct took place while on or within 1,000 feet of any school property or while driving through a school crossing. Nor shall it be relevant to the imposition of sentence that no juveniles were present on the school property or crossing zone at the time of the offense or that the school was not in session. (h) A court also may order a person convicted pursuant to subsection a. of this section, to participate in a supervised visitation program as either a condition of probation or a form of community service, giving preference to those who were under the age of 21 at the time of the offense. Prior to ordering a person to participate in such a program, the court may consult with any person who may provide useful information on the defendant's physical, emotional and mental suitability for the visit to ensure that it will not cause any injury to the defendant. The court also may order that the defendant participate in a counseling session under the supervision of the Intoxicated Driving Program Unit prior to participating in the supervised visitation program. The supervised visitation program shall be at one or more of the following facilities which have agreed to participate in the program under the supervision of the facility's personnel and the probation department: (1) a trauma center, critical care center or acute care hospital having basic emergency services, which receives victims of motor vehicle accidents for the purpose of observing appropriate victims of drunk drivers and victims who are, themselves, drunk drivers; (2) a facility which cares for advanced alcoholics or drug abusers, to observe persons in the advanced stages of alcoholism or drug abuse; or (3) if approved by a county medical examiner, the office of the county medical examiner or a public morgue to observe appropriate victims of vehicle accidents involving drunk drivers. As used in this section, "appropriate victim" means a victim whose condition is determined by the facility's supervisory personnel and the probation officer to be appropriate for demonstrating the results of accidents involving drunk drivers without being unnecessarily gruesome or traumatic to the defendant. If at any time before or during a visitation the facility's supervisory personnel and the probation officer determine that the visitation may be or is traumatic or otherwise inappropriate for that defendant, the visitation shall be terminated without prejudice to the defendant. The program may include a personal conference after the visitation, which may include the sentencing judge or the judge who coordinates the program for the court, the defendant, defendant's counsel, and, if available, the defendant's parents to discuss the visitation and its effect on the defendant's future conduct. If a personal conference is not practicable because of the defendant's absence from the jurisdiction, conflicting time schedules, or any other reason, the court shall require the defendant to submit a written report concerning the visitation experience and its impact on the defendant. The county, a court, any facility visited pursuant to the program, any agents, employees, or independent contractors of the court, county, or facility visited pursuant to the program, and any person supervising a defendant during the visitation, are not liable for any civil damages resulting from injury to the defendant, or for civil damages associated with the visitation which are caused by the defendant, except for willful or grossly negligent acts intended to, or reasonably expected to result in, that injury or damage. The Supreme Court may adopt court rules or directives to effectuate the purposes of this subsection. (i) In addition to any other fine, fee, or other charge imposed pursuant to law, the court shall assess a person convicted of a violation of the provisions of this section a surcharge of $100, of which amount $50 shall be payable to the municipality in which the conviction was obtained and $50 shall be payable to the Treasurer of the State of New Jersey for deposit into the General Fund.
N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.14 Operation of a motor vehicle by person who has consumed alcohol but is under the legal age to purchase alcoholic beverages; penalties Any person under the legal age to purchase alcoholic beverages who operates a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.01% or more, but less than 0.08%, by weight of alcohol in his blood, shall forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State or shall be prohibited from obtaining a license to operate a motor vehicle in this State for a period of not less than 30 or more than 90 days beginning on the date he becomes eligible to obtain a license or on the day of conviction, whichever is later, and shall perform community service for a period of not less than 15 or more than 30 days. In addition, the person shall satisfy the program and fee requirements of an Intoxicated Driver Resource Center or participate in a program of alcohol education and highway safety as prescribed by the chief administrator. The penalties provided under the provisions of this section shall be in addition to the penalties which the court may impose under N.J.S. 2C:33-15, R.S. 33:1-81, R.S. 39:4-50 or any other law.
N.J.S.A. 39:4-51 Sentence for violation of section N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 must be served; release on work release program
A person who has been convicted of a first or second violation of section 39:4-50 of this Title, and in pursuance thereof has been imprisoned in a county jail or workhouse in the county in which the offense was committed, shall not, after commitment, be released therefrom until the term of imprisonment imposed has been served. A person imprisoned in the county jail or workhouse may in the discretion of the court, be released on a work release program. No warden or other officer having custody of the county jail or workhouse shall release therefrom a person so committed, unless the person has been released by the court on a work release program, until the sentence has been served. A person sentenced to an inpatient rehabilitation program may upon petition by the treating agency be released, by the court, to an outpatient rehabilitation program for the duration of the original sentence. Nothing in this section shall be construed to interfere in any way with the operation of a writ of habeas corpus, a proceeding in lieu of the prerogative writs, or an appeal. The administrator shall adopt such rules and regulations to effectuate the provisions of this section as he shall deem necessary.
CONCLUSION The State must clearly prove certain conditions, among others:
1. The equipment was in proper working order was periodically inspected in accordance with procedures. Romano v. Kimmelman, 96 N.J. 66, 81 and 82 (1984) 2. The operator was qualified__i.e., properly certified__to administer the instrument. Id.; State v. Ernst, 230 N.J. Super. 238 (App. Div. 1989), cert den. 117 N.J. 40; 3. The test was given correctly-- ie in accordance with official instructions and accepted procedures. Romano, supra at 81 and 82
The law entitles drunk driving defendants to pre_trial discovery. R.3:13_3; R.7:4_2(h); State v. Young, 242 N.J. Super. 467, 470 (App. Div. 1990); State v. Ford, 240 N.J. Super. 44, 48 (App. Div. 1990); State v. Utsch, 184 N.J. Super. 575, 579 (App. Div. 1982). Due process requires the State disclose evidence that is material to either guilt or punishment; indeed, the prosecution has a constitutional duty to turn over exculpatory evidence that would raise reasonable doubt about a defendant's guilt. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 98 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed. 2d 342 (1976). A wide variety of materials in the State's possession could constitute exculpatory information to which a defendant is entitled. Ford, supra at 52 A demand for discovery has been served upon the prosecutor who has the responsibility to answer. State v. Tull, 234 N.J. Super. 486, 494 (Law Div. 1989). A defendant's right to discovery is not dependent upon an appraisal of the beneficial value of the material sought to be discovered. State v. Polito, 116 N.J. Super. 552 (App. Div. 1977), Ford, supra at 51). Thus, a prosecutor is expected to act reasonably when responding to a discovery demand. Tull, supra at 496. The prosecutor may not refuse a discovery demand simply because the information or materials sought are not in the municipal offices or within easy reach. Id. at 495. The municipal prosecutor cannot refuse production on the ground that the requested information is not known by the prosecutor personally to be in existence when its existence is either common knowledge of the police department or when the knowledge could be obtained by reasonable inquiry. Id. at 500. The municipal prosecutor must either object to what the prosecutor perceives to be irrelevant discovery requests, or respond within 10 days of the receipt of the defendant's request for discovery. Ford supra at 51; see Tull, supra at 500. The municipal prosecutor may be sanctioned for failing to provide discovery. R.3:13_; see State v. Audette, 201 N.J. Super. 410 (App. Div. 1985) State v. Polasky, 216 N.J. Super. 549 (Law Div. 1986). A defendant who believes the State has not supplied relevant materials reasonably required for the defense may give notice to the State and the court prior to the date set for commencement of trial where possible. Ford, supra at 52. Information relating to prerequisite conditions establishing reliability is highly relevant, Ford, supra at 52, and extremely material. Id. at 51. Thus, information concerning conditions under which tests were held, the machine operator's competence, the particular machine's state of repair and identification, and documentation of the ampoule used for defendant's breath tests are all relevant inquiries. Id.
Conclusion If charged with Driving While Intoxicated, immediately schedule an in-office appointment with a trial attorney. Don't rely on a real estate attorney, public defender or a family member who simply attended law school. When your driving privileges and ability to drive to work is on the line, hire an experienced attorney.
KENNETH VERCAMMEN & ASSOCIATES, PC ATTORNEY AT LAW 2053 Woodbridge Ave. Edison, NJ 08817 (Phone) 732-572-0500 (Fax) 732-572-0030
TRIAL AND LITIGATION EXPERIENCE In his private practice, he has devoted a substantial portion of his professional time to the preparation and trial of litigated matters. He appears in Courts throughout New Jersey several times each week on many personal injury matters, Criminal and Municipal/ traffic Court trials, Probate hearings, and contested administrative law hearings.

Tuesday, May 22, 2018

Suppression granted where no furtive movements and merely being fixated no grounds for search STATE v ISMAEL MOJICA,

Suppression granted where no furtive movements and merely being fixated no grounds for search
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

        Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ISMAEL MOJICA,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________

              Submitted February 28, 2018 – Decided March 22, 2018

              Before Judges Fuentes and Suter.NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                      APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
     This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
      Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
        parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.




                                       SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                       APPELLATE DIVISION
                                       DOCKET NO. A-2411-16T3
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 16- 02-0579. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Alicia J. Hubbard, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief). Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lauren Bonfiglio, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM Defendant Ismael Mojica appeals from the October 25, 2016 Judgment of Conviction, following his guilty plea under Indictment 16-02-0579 to unlawful possession of a weapon (handgun). He alleges the trial court erred by denying his earlier motion to suppress evidence of a handgun. We conclude the suppression motion should have been granted. We reverse the order denying suppression and defendant's conviction under Indictment 16-02-0579. In 2016, defendant was indicted for second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (handgun), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (Count One); and fourth-degree possession of hollow point bullets, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(f) (Count Two). Following denial of his motion to suppress the handgun, defendant pled guilty to Count One. Count Two was dismissed.1 Defendant was sentenced to a five-year term of imprisonment with a forty-two month period of parole ineligibility. We gather the following facts from the record developed at the suppression motion. On October 15, 2015 at about eight p.m., Detective Adolpho Furtado of the Newark Police Department received an anonymous "Crime Stopper" hotline tip that a man near a liquor store at the intersection of Hartford and Norfolk in Newark was in possession 1 On the same day, defendant also pled guilty to charges in three unrelated indictments, 15-10-2280, 15-12-2972 and 16-04-1136. He was sentenced to three-year terms on each indictment to run concurrently with the unlawful weapons offense. Another indictment, 16-02-0528, was dismissed. Our decision here on the unlawful weapons offense does not affect his plea on the other unrelated indictments. 2 A-2411-16T3 of a handgun. The person was described as a black male, "wearing gray sweat pants with a white and grey hoodie." Crime Stopper hotline tips are not recorded. Detective Furtado relayed the tip to a sergeant who was on patrol in the area. According to the testimony of Detective Turon Hinnant, also of the Newark Police Department, Detective Villette was conducting surveillance on the location. There were between five and eight males standing in front of a building at Norfolk Street. A number of officers in vehicles approached the individuals who were outside. Those individuals were told to "put their hands out and lay down on the ground." Hinnant testified that Villette observed a person, who fit the general description, leaving the liquor store, walk over to and enter a white Buick that was parked outside the Norfolk Street property. Along with another detective, Detective Hinnant approached the driver's side window of the white car parked near the building and observed defendant "looking over his right shoulder towards the sidewalk where the other detectives were engaging with the five to eight males." He testified that while defendant was "fixated on what they were doing, [defendant] put an object into his right coat pocket." Hinnant demonstrated this by making a motion toward his waistband area. Hinnant "believed [defendant] was trying to conceal a weapon." He opened the car 3 A-2411-16T3 door, to defendant's surprise, and grabbed "towards the right pocket." Hinnant felt a metal object that he believed was a gun. He held onto the object, and asked defendant to step out of the car. Once outside, Hinnant reached inside defendant's pocket and found a handgun that was loaded with hollow point bullets. Defendant was arrested. He was wearing a "[b]lack coat, white shirt, grey sweat pants." Defendant testified that he stopped at a grocery store, not a liquor store, where he purchased "snacks and soda." He parked on the street. When he got back into his car, he was speaking with a friend who was a passenger. Then "[c]ars surrounded the area" and he was not able to move out. He testified an officer approached the car and told him to "step out." Defendant opened the door and did so. He denied that the officer reached in the car. The officers searched him. The trial judge denied defendant's motion to suppress, finding the facts were not in dispute. Although the parties agreed an anonymous tip alone could not support a warrantless search, the court found the State had "overcome the hurdle in providing additional information as it relates to the tip, including the hour of the day, a location, the clothing, the car, and the activity." The court found defendant's "action" of "making contact with a pocket" gave the officer "pause for his protection at that 4 A-2411-16T3 point" and "justifie[d] the officer at least searching that area . . . . for his protection." On appeal, defendant raises the issue that LAW ENFORCEMENT CONDUCTED A SEIZURE AND SEARCH OF MR. MOJICA WITHOUT REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT HE WAS ARMED AND, THEREFORE, THE FRUITS OF THE SUBSEQUENT SEARCH MUST BE SUPPRESSED. U.S. CONST. AMENDS IV AND XIV; N.J. CONST. ART. I, PAR. 7. Our review of the denial of a suppression motion is limited. State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 44 (2011). "When reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or deny a suppression motion, [we] 'must defer to the factual findings of the trial court so long as those findings are supported by sufficient evidence in the record.'" State v. Dunbar, 229 N.J. 521, 538 (2017) (quoting State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 262 (2015)). "We will set aside a trial court's findings of fact only when such findings 'are clearly mistaken.'" Ibid. (quoting Hubbard, 222 N.J. at 262). "We accord no deference, however, to a trial court's interpretation of law, which we review de novo." Ibid. (quoting State v. Hathaway, 222 N.J. 453, 467 (2015)). Our legal analysis will be guided by the motion judge's factual findings. However, whether the police had a reasonable, articulable basis to detain and search defendant is a legal question, not a factual one, to which we owe no deference. 5 A-2411-16T3 Both the Federal and State constitutions protect citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7. An investigatory stop, sometimes referred to as a Terry2 stop, implicates constitutional requirements and must be based on "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts" provide a "reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 247 (2007) (quoting State v. Rodriquez, 172 N.J. 117, 126 (2002)). "Because an investigative detention is a temporary seizure that restricts a person's movement, it must be based on an officer's 'reasonable and particularized suspicion . . . that an individual has just engaged in, or was about to engage in, criminal activity.'" State v. Rosario, 229 N.J. 263, 272 (2017) (quoting State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 356 (2002)). The officer's "articulable reasons" or "particularized suspicion" is based on the officer's assessment of the totality of the circumstances. State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 504 (1986). Here, the stop was based, in part, on information relayed to the police by an anonymous tip. "In determining the reliability of a tip, a court must consider an informant's 'veracity,' 'reliability,' and 'basis of knowledge.'" Stovall, 170 N.J. at 2 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 6 A-2411-16T3 362 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328-29 (1990)). To determine the informant's "basis of knowledge", "the nature and details revealed in the tip may imply" that the knowledge of the criminal activity comes from a "trustworthy source." Stovall, 170 N.J. at 362. "In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, a court must consider 'the totality of the circumstances- the whole picture.'" Id. at 361 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). The reliability of the tip is part of the totality of the circumstances analysis. Id. at 361-62. Generally, an anonymous tip is not sufficient alone to justify a stop because it lacks, veracity, reliability and a basis of knowledge. State v. Matthews, 398 N.J. Super. 551, 559 (App. Div. 2008). The State contends the Crime Stopper's tip was verified because a person matching the description was found at the location indicated. Those facts verified a portion of the information, but did not verify the assertion of illegality. For that, the State contends that it was nighttime, defendant was "fixated" on the police activity and defendant made a furtive gesture by moving something to his pocket. These combination of factors do not provide a reasonable articulable basis for the stop and seizure. In Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000), the police received an anonymous tip that a person at a specific location and dressed in a plaid shirt had a 7 A-2411-16T3 gun. The police saw a person matching the description at the location, but did not "see a firearm, and J.L. made no threatening or otherwise unusual movements." Id. at 268. The police told J.L. to put up his hands and frisked him, finding a gun. The Supreme Court found there were not reasonable grounds to stop and frisk J.L. because the anonymous tip, without more, was not "reliable in its assertion of illegality." Id. at 272. Our courts have held that an anonymous tip without more "is rarely sufficient to establish a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity." Rodriquez, 172 N.J. at 127 (citing Alabama, 496 U.S. at 329.). "To justify action based on an anonymous tip, the police in the typical case must verify that the tip is reliable by some independent corroborative effort." Id. at 127 (citing Alabama, 496 U.S. at 329-30). In Rodriguez, the Court found "that the officers lacked a sufficient basis to detain defendant" where the stop was "based solely on information furnished by an anonymous informant who provided no explanation or basis of knowledge for that information." Id. at 132-33. In State v. Privott, 203 N.J. 16, 28-30 (2010), the Court upheld an investigatory stop and frisk based on an anonymous tip combined with the officer's knowledge about the defendant from a prior narcotics arrest. This included the officer's awareness that "defendant was associated with violent gangs that were 8 A-2411-16T3 responsible for recent shootings in the area," defendant appeared to be nervous, tried to walk away and then "made a movement of his hand to his waistband." Id. at 28-29. By contrast, in State v. Richards, 351 N.J. Super. 289, 308 (App. Div. 2002), the arrest was made in an area that was not a high crime or high drug area, the defendant made no furtive movements, did not act nervously, was using a pay phone, was not known to the police and when stopped, simply stood "quiet in the face of police presence." Id. at 306. In this light, we held that the circumstances "did not establish a reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed and dangerous justifying the Terry stop." Id. at 308. See also Matthews, 398 N.J. Super. at 559 (invaliding search based solely on unidentified anonymous tip). Here, there was nothing unusual about leaving a store at eight o'clock at night, observing police activity occurring right outside one's car, and then reaching into one's pocket while seated in the car. The officers did not testify that they knew defendant, or that this was a high crime area. Defendant had not committed a motor vehicle violation. He did not attempt to flee. The police did not testify that he was acting nervously or suspiciously. He was at best "fixated" on the nearby police activity and then made a singular movement of his hand to his pocket. "[A]n officer's safety concerns based on [these ostensibly] asserted 'furtive' 9 A-2411-16T3 movements by defendant cannot provide reasonable and articulable suspicion to support a detention in the first instance." Rosario, 229 N.J. at 277. On this record, the totality of the circumstances lacked an objectively reasonable articulable basis for the investigatory stop of defendant and seizure of the weapon. We are constrained to reverse the order denying suppression of the evidence of the handgun under Indictment 16-02-0579. We remand the case for further proceeding under that indictment. Our decision does not affect defendant's guilty pleas or sentencing under indictments 15-10-2280, 15-12-2972 or 16-04-1136. Reversed and remanded. 10 A-2411-16T3

Saturday, May 12, 2018

State v. Hagans (A-37-16)


 State v. Hagans (A-37-16) (078014) 
Argued January 16, 2018 -- Decided April 23, 2018 
     Because the trial court’s determination that the driver ultimately knowingly and voluntarily gave consent to search is supported by sufficient credible evidence, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search.
TIMPONE, J., writing for the Court. 
In this case, the Court considers the validity of a driver’s consent to search her automobile after she initially denied a police officer’s request to search it. 
In March 2012, New Jersey State Trooper John Faust pulled over a 2002 Mercury Sable with a damaged taillight on Interstate 295 in Burlington County. The driver, Shonsheray Chandler, had changed lanes without signaling. There were passengers in Chandler’s car: her six-year-old daughter, who was in the back seat, and defendant Malcolm Hagans, sitting in the front passenger seat. Faust approached the passenger side of the vehicle and smelled the odor of burnt marijuana in the vehicle. Faust asked defendant to step out of the vehicle, arrested him, handcuffed him, called for back up, and administered Miranda warnings. Faust then asked Chandler to step out of the vehicle, administered Miranda warnings, and questioned her about the presence of marijuana in the vehicle. Faust handcuffed Chandler and placed her in the backseat of his police vehicle. Chandler denied knowing defendant had marijuana on him and denied that she had been smoking marijuana in the car. 
Faust requested Chandler consent to a search of her vehicle. Before reading the consent form to her, Faust told Chandler that “it would be a lot easier if you would just make things easy.” Faust read the consent form aloud. He advised Chandler of her right to refuse consent and that if she refused, barring any other reason to detain her, she could leave. He also explained if she consented, she had a right to be present during the search and could withdraw her consent at any time. Faust asked whether she would give consent, and Chandler responded “no.” 
Faust then discussed his next steps. “I know, but at this time . . . we are going to apply for a search warrant, okay, and that is kinda going to prolong the inevitable. I would just like it to be easier.” Chandler replied, “Go ahead.” Faust then inquired, “What’s that ma’am?,” to which Chandler repeated “Go ahead.” Faust asked, “Are you sure?” Chandler answered, “Yeah.” Faust countered, “So you’re saying yes?” Chandler responded, “Yes.” To confirm Chandler’s decision, Faust re-read her the consent-to-search form in its entirety. Faust then again asked Chandler if she consented to the search of her vehicle; she responded “yes.” Faust repeated for the Mobile Video Recorder (MVR) in the police vehicle that Chandler had initially denied consent but changed her mind and consented because she “did not want to wait any longer.” The search produced a bag of marijuana and a loaded .22 caliber pistol. 
Defendant admitted to ownership of the marijuana and the pistol. He was charged with unlawful possession of a weapon, fourth-degree child abuse, and a disorderly persons offense for possession of marijuana. At a suppression hearing, the trial court found that Faust had probable cause to pull the vehicle over and for a search. Although the court found that several of the factors set forth in State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 352-53 (1965), militated against a finding of Chandler’s voluntary consent, it determined the totality of the circumstances indicated that the consent to search was valid and not coerced. The Appellate Division affirmed based on the totality of the evidence.
The Court granted certification, limited to the issue of whether Chandler’s “consent to search the motor vehicle was freely and voluntarily given.” 229 N.J. 161 (2017). 
HELD: Because the trial court’s determination that the driver ultimately knowingly and voluntarily gave consent to search is supported by sufficient credible evidence, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search. 

1.   In reviewing the grant or denial of a motion to suppress, an appellate court will uphold the trial court’s factual findings underlying that decision so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. Video-recorded evidence is reviewed under the same standard. State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 381 (2017). The panel’s decision here predated the Court’s opinion in S.S. and included findings based on the panel’s own de novo review of the MVR. The Court adheres to the principle enunciated in S.S. 

2. Consent to search is a long-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Consent searches of motor vehicles that are pulled over by police are valid only if: (1) there is a reasonable and articulable basis beyond the initial valid motor vehicle stop to continue the detention after completion of the valid traffic stop; and (2) the consent is given knowingly and voluntarily. 
3. In State v. King, the Court delineated factors for use in considering the voluntariness of consent. 44 N.J. at 352-53. Factors potentially indicating coerced consent include: “(1) that consent was made by an individual already arrested; (2) that consent was obtained despite a denial of guilt; (3) that consent was obtained only after the accused had refused initial requests for consent to search; (4) that consent was given where the subsequent search resulted in a seizure of contraband which the accused must have known would be discovered; [and] (5) that consent was given while the defendant was handcuffed.” Ibid. Factors potentially indicating voluntariness of consent include: “(1) that consent was given where the accused had reason to believe that the police would find no contraband; (2) that the defendant admitted his guilt before consent; [and] (3) that the defendant affirmatively assisted the police officers.” Id. at 353. The Court emphasized that those factors were not commandments, but “guideposts to aid a trial judge in arriving at his conclusion.” Ibid. Voluntariness depends on “the totality of the particular circumstances of the case” with each case “necessarily depend[ing] upon its own facts.” Ibid. 

4. After determining the automobile stop was valid, the trial court acknowledged and evaluated the King factors but found that Chandler consented to the search voluntarily even though a majority of those factors cut against a finding of voluntariness. Notably, the court stressed the officer’s lack of insistence, the short period between the initial refusal and the consent, the officer’s non-aggressive request for clarification, and Chandler’s repeated affirmations that she did, in fact, give her consent to search. In the trial court’s view, the video evidence was more compelling than the results suggested by a mechanical application of the King factors to the facts of the case. Over fifty years ago, when King was decided, MVRs did not exist. Because of rapid developments in technology, MVRs are increasingly mounted in police vehicles, having become another important tool with the capacity to aid in the search for the truth. The MVR aided the trial court here because it permitted visual and audial evaluation of the police and driver’s interaction on the issue of consent. Specifically, the MVR footage helped the trial court determine that Chandler voluntarily consented to the search of her vehicle. Sufficient credible evidence supports that determination. 

5. Defendant contends that Faust’s statement—“We are going to apply for a search warrant, okay, and that is just kinda going to prolong the inevitable”—coerced Chandler’s consent. Although the use of the term “inevitable” was somewhat anticipatory as to what might follow, the manner in which it was used here was not coercive. As a best practice, police officers should tell a suspect only the measures they intend to take—apply for a search warrant—and should not offer a prediction about whether a warrant will issue. Here, Faust had probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant given the odor of burnt marijuana. Faust’s statement was a candid assessment of the likelihood that a judge would grant his application for a search warrant. 
6. Sufficient credible evidence supports the trial court’s determination that Chandler’s consent was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances, despite the presence of several of the potentially coercive King factors. Here, technological advancements permitted the trial court to better evaluate the manner in which Faust obtained consent. Such possibilities—which are increasingly common today—are precisely why the King Court factors are guideposts rather than rigid absolute authority. 

The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’s opinion.

Warrantless blood draw permitted in fatal accident based on exigency State v. Shayna Zalcberg

Warrantless blood draw permitted in fatal accident based on exigency
State v. Shayna Zalcberg(A-41-16) (078308)  Argued November 6, 2017 -- Decided March 27, 2018  FERNANDEZ-VINA, J., writing for the Court.            
         In this case, the Court considers whether police officers violated the Fourth Amendmentof the United States Constitution and Article 1, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution when they took a sample of defendant’s blood without a warrant during an investigation of alleged driving while intoxicated.            
         On the night of July 27, 2011, the Freehold Township Police Department received a report of a motor vehicle accident and dispatched officers to the scene. On their arrival, the officers determined that the accident was serious and called emergency medical and fire personnel for assistance. The police secured the roadway so that no other vehicles could approach the crash in order to render the situation less dangerous for the first responders. Because the accident scene was on a major thoroughfare and the crash coincided with the first night of the heavily trafficked Monmouth County Fair, several officers were deployed to block off access to the road and to direct traffic. They continued to do so throughout the entirety of the accident investigation. All three occupants of defendant’s vehicle were transported via helicopter to Jersey Shore Medical Center for treatment.            
         Two of the emergency medical personnel expressed their concern to a police officer that defendant had smelled of alcohol. Further, after the top of defendant’s vehicle had been removed, officers observed a miniature bottle of an alcoholic beverage in the vehicle’s console. The officers concluded that there was probable cause to believe that defendant had been driving while under the influence of alcohol. Because defendant was incapacitated as a result of her injuries and therefore unable to undergo field sobriety tests, the officers decided that it would be prudent to obtain a sample of defendant’s blood.        
           At the time of the accident, it was common practice in the Freehold Township Police Department to take blood samples in serious motor vehicle accidents. Warrants were then available telephonically under New Jersey Court Rule 3:5-3(b), but none of the police officers present believed that a search warrant was required to obtain a blood sample and none of them had been trained in obtaining one. Thus, there was no discussion about obtaining a search warrant for the sample of defendant’s blood. An officer was dispatched to acquire the sample.          
The officer arrived at the hospital shortly thereafter and inquired into defendant’s location. The officer was instructed that he would have to wait but was not given an estimate as to how long. About an hour later, the officer was granted access to defendant and requested that a nurse obtain a sample of her blood. The nurse extracted the blood sample and delivered it to the officer.            
         A grand jury charged defendant with second-degree vehicular homicide, two counts of third-degree assault by auto, and fourth-degree assault by auto. Defendant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the results of the warrantless blood test. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress in a written opinion. After finding that the officers had probable cause to obtain a blood sample, the judge held that the State failed to establish that an exigency existed sufficient to constitute a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. The judge determined, based upon the totality of the circumstances, that the only exigency the State could establish was the natural metabolization of alcohol in defendant’s blood, which was alone insufficient to justify a warrantless blood draw under Missouri v. McNeely,  569 U.S. 141(2013), and State v. Adkins,  221 N.J. 300, 303 (2015). An Appellate Division panel affirmed, substantially for the reasons expressed in the trial judge’s written decision. The Court granted the State’s motion for leave to appeal.  229 N.J. 249(2017).  HELD: The totality of the circumstances in this case evince an objective exigency, relaxing the need for a warrant and rendering the officer’s warrantless blood draw constitutional.                                                             

         1. A warrantless search is constitutionally invalid unless one of the few well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement applies. The exigent-circumstances exception is frequently cited in connection with warrantless blood draws. In Schmerber v. California,  384 U.S. 757(1966), the United States Supreme Court established that a compelled taking of a blood sample for the purpose of alcohol-content analysis constitutes a search within the Fourth Amendment’s framework. Approximately fifty years later, in McNeely, the Supreme Court clarified that while the natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood may support a finding of exigency in a specific case, as it did in Schmerber, it does not do so categorically. Whether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances. 569 U.S. at 156
          2. Prior to McNeely, New Jersey, like many states,   provided de facto, if not de jure, support for law enforcement to believe that alcohol dissipation in and of itself supported a finding of exigency for a warrantless search of bodily fluids in suspected driving-under-the-influence cases. Adkins,  221 N.J. at 303. Based on that pre-McNeely understanding, the defendant in Adkins, suspected of drunk driving, was subjected to a warrantless blood test following a single-car accident. Id. at 302. On appeal, the Court pronounced that McNealy’s directive that courts must evaluate the totality of the circumstances in assessing exigency, one factor of which is the human body’s natural dissipation of alcohol would receive   pipeline retroactivity.  Id. at 312, 317. The Court directed that reviewing courts must focus on the objective exigency of the circumstances that the officer faced in the situationand stated that the potential dissipation of [blood-alcohol] evidence may be given substantial weight as a factor to be considered in the totality of the circumstancesId. at 303 (emphases added). 
         3. In State v. Jones, the Appellate Division determined that a warrantless blood draw was constitutional under the totality of the circumstances.  441 N.J. Super. 317, 321 (App. Div. 2015). Jones involved a defendant who caused a three-vehicle accident at a heavily traveled intersection during rush hour. Several police officers, EMS personnel, and firefighters arrived to manage the scene and tend to the occupants of the three vehicles. The defendant was unconscious in her car; it took half an hour to remove her from her vehicle, at which time emergency personnel smelled alcohol on her breath. One officer proceeded to the hospital to follow up on the defendant’s injuries. When the defendant regained consciousness at the hospital, she displayed signs of intoxication, such as slurred speech and inability to answer questions. Moreover, the defendant admitted to the officer that she had consumed alcohol earlier. Approximately one hour and fifteen minutes after the accident occurred, a nurse drew a sample of the defendant’s blood at the officer’s request. The officer did not seek a warrant before ordering the test because he was not required tounder standard procedure and had not received training on telephonic warrants. 
         4. Here, defendant’s accident was a serious one that occurred on a busy state highway on the night of a nearby event that drew unusually high traffic. Any delay in seeking to obtain defendant’s blood sample after the establishment of probable cause is attributed to the complexity of the situation and the reasonable allocation of limited police resources not a lack of emergent circumstances. The officers’ lack of awareness of any formal procedure through which they could obtain a telephonic warrant, coupled with their belief that they did not need such a warrant, suggests that there was no reasonable availability of a warrant. Accidents do not, per se, create objective exigency, but the circumstances that accompany them may factor into a court’s exigency analysis. The facts of this case, in totality, indicate an objective exigency: a fatal accident with multiple serious injuries, the absence of an established telephonic warrant system, and the myriad duties with which the police officers present were tasked.  Substantial weight is also afforded to the potential dissipation ofthe alcohol in defendant’s blood. Adkins,  221 N.J. at 303. The warrantless blood draw did not violate defendant’s constitutional rights in this case. 
         The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.           
          JUSTICES ALBIN AND TIMPONE, DISSENTING, are of the view that the majority has not applied the principles set forth in McNeely and stress that warrantless searches are presumptively invalid. Justices Albin and Timpone add that a deferential standard of review should guide the Court in reviewing a suppression order. An officer’s ignorance of the law does not justify the violation of a person’s federal constitutional rights, according to Justices Albin and Timpone.        

Friday, May 11, 2018

2c:35-5 Manufacturing, Distributing or Dispensing.

2c:35-5 Manufacturing, Distributing or Dispensing.  a.  Except as authorized by P.L.1970, c.226 (C.24:21-1 et seq.), it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or purposely:

   (1)  To manufacture, distribute or dispense, or to possess or have under his control with intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog; or

   (2)  To create, distribute, or possess or have under his control with intent to distribute, a counterfeit controlled dangerous substance.

   b.   Any person who violates subsection a. with respect to:

   (1)  Heroin, or its analog, or coca leaves and any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation of coca leaves, and any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation thereof which is chemically equivalent or identical with any of these substances, or analogs, except that the substances shall not include decocainized coca leaves or extractions which do not contain cocaine or ecogine,  or 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine or 3,4-methylenedioxyamphetamine, in a quantity of five ounces or more including any adulterants or dilutants is guilty of a crime of the first degree.  The defendant shall, except as provided in N.J.S.2C:35-12, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment by the court.  The term of imprisonment shall include the imposition of a minimum term which shall be fixed at, or between, one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed, during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole.  Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:43-3, a fine of up to $500,000.00 may be imposed;

   (2)  A substance referred to in paragraph (1) of this subsection, in a quantity of one-half ounce or more but less than five ounces, including any adulterants or dilutants is guilty of a crime of the second degree;

   (3)  A substance referred to in paragraph (1) of this subsection in a quantity less than one-half ounce including any adulterants or dilutants is guilty of a crime of the third degree except that, notwithstanding the provisions of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:43-3, a fine of up to $75,000.00 may be imposed;

   (4)  A substance classified as a narcotic drug in Schedule I or II other than those specifically covered in this section, or the analog of any such substance, in a quantity of one ounce or more including any adulterants or dilutants is guilty of a crime of the second degree;

   (5)  A substance classified as a narcotic drug in Schedule I or II other than those specifically covered in this section, or the analog of any such substance, in a quantity of less than one ounce including any adulterants or dilutants is guilty of a crime of the third degree except that, notwithstanding the provisions of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:43-3, a fine of up to $75,000.00 may be imposed;

   (6)  Lysergic acid diethylamide, or its analog, in a quantity of 100 milligrams or more including any adulterants or dilutants, or phencyclidine, or its analog, in a quantity of 10 grams or more including any adulterants or dilutants, is guilty of a crime of the first degree. Except as provided in N.J.S.2C:35-12, the court shall impose a term of imprisonment which shall include the imposition of a minimum term, fixed at, or between, one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed by the court, during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:43-3, a fine of up to $500,000.00 may be imposed;

   (7)  Lysergic acid diethylamide, or its analog, in a quantity of less than 100 milligrams including any adulterants or dilutants, or where the amount is undetermined, or phencyclidine, or its analog, in a quantity of less than 10 grams including any adulterants or dilutants, or where the amount is undetermined, is guilty of a crime of the second degree;

   (8)  Methamphetamine, or its analog, or phenyl-2-propanone (P2P), in a quantity of five ounces or more including any adulterants or dilutants is guilty of a crime of the first degree. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:43-3, a fine of up to $300,000.00 may be imposed;

   (9)  (a)  Methamphetamine, or its analog, or phenyl-2-propanone (P2P), in a quantity of one-half ounce or more but less than five ounces including any adulterants or dilutants is guilty of a crime of the second degree;

   (b)  Methamphetamine, or its analog, or phenyl-2-propanone  (P2P), in a quantity of less than one-half ounce including any adulterants or dilutants is guilty of a crime of the third degree except that notwithstanding the provisions of subsection b. of  N.J.S.2C:43-3, a fine of up to $75,000.00 may be imposed;

   (10)  (a)  Marijuana in a quantity of 25 pounds or more including any adulterants or dilutants, or 50 or more marijuana plants, regardless of weight, or hashish in a quantity of five pounds or more including any adulterants or dilutants, is guilty of a crime of the first degree.  Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:43-3, a fine of up to $300,000.00 may be imposed;

   (b)  Marijuana in a quantity of five pounds or more but less than 25 pounds including any adulterants or dilutants, or 10 or more but fewer than 50 marijuana plants, regardless of weight, or hashish in a quantity of one pound or more but less than five pounds, including any adulterants and dilutants, is guilty of a crime of the second degree;

   (11)  Marijuana in a quantity of one ounce or more but less than five pounds including any adulterants or dilutants, or hashish in a quantity of five grams or more but less than one pound including any adulterants or dilutants, is guilty of a crime of the third degree except that, notwithstanding the provisions of subsection b. of  N.J.S.2C:43-3, a fine of up to $25,000.00 may be imposed;

   (12)  Marijuana in a quantity of less than one ounce including any adulterants or dilutants, or hashish in a quantity of less than five grams including any adulterants or dilutants, is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree;

   (13)  Any other controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule I, II, III or IV, or its analog, is guilty of a crime of the third degree, except that, notwithstanding the provisions of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:43-3, a fine of up to $25,000.00 may be imposed; or

   (14)  Any Schedule V substance, or its analog, is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree except that, notwithstanding the provisions of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:43-3, a fine of up to $25,000.00 may be imposed.

   c.   Where the degree of the offense for violation of this section depends on the quantity of the substance, the quantity involved shall be determined by the trier of fact.  Where the indictment or accusation so provides, the quantity involved in individual acts of manufacturing, distribution, dispensing or possessing with intent to distribute may be aggregated in determining the grade of the offense, whether distribution or dispensing is to the same person or several persons, provided that each individual act of manufacturing, distribution, dispensing or possession with intent to distribute was committed within the applicable statute of limitations.

   L.1987, c.106, s.1;  amended 1988, c.44, s.2; 1997, c.181, s.3; 1997, c.186, s.3; 2000, c.55; 2000, c.136.