Defense of DWI Blood case

Arrested in NJ ? Hire a real criminal defense attorney, not someone who sends you solicitation letters in the mail.

Arrested in NJ ? Hire a real criminal defense attorney, not someone who sends you solicitation letters in the mail.

Kenneth Vercammen's Law Office represents individuals charged with criminal, drug offenses, and serious traffic violations throughout New Jersey. Kenneth Vercammen was the NJ State Bar Municipal Court Attorney of the Year and past president of the Middlesex County Municipal Prosecutor's Association.

Try to Avoid Some of the Consequences of a Criminal Guilty Plea:

1. You will have to appear in open court and tell the judge what you did that makes you guilty of the particular offense(s)

2. If you plead guilty:

a. You will have a criminal record

b. You may go to Jail or Prison.

c. You will have to pay Fines and Court Costs.

3. If you are on Probation, you will have to submit to random drug and urine testing. If you violate Probation, you often go to jail.

4. In indictable matters, you will be required to provide a DNA sample, which could be used by law enforcement for the investigation of criminal activity, and pay for the cost of testing.

5. You must pay restitution if the court finds there is a victim who has suffered a loss and if the court finds that you are able or will be able in the future to pay restitution.

6. If you are a public office holder or employee, you can be required to forfeit your office or job by virtue of your plea of guilty.

7. If you are not a United States citizen or national, you may be deported by virtue of your plea of guilty.

8. You must wait 5-10 years to expunge a first offense. 2C:52-3

9. You could be put on Probation.

10. You may be required to do Community Service.

Don't give up! The Law Office of Kenneth Vercammen can provide experienced attorney representation for criminal and serious motor vehicle violations.

1.      Telephone consultation with client;

2.      Office consultation with client;

3.      Offer sound legal advice to client, plus access to our legal info website www.njlaws.com

4.      Preparation of Letter of Representation to Municipal Court;

5.      Preparation of Letter of Representation to Municipal Court Prosecutor;

6.      Preparation of statement to provide legal services;

7.      Copies of all correspondence to Court and Prosecutor to client;

8.      Opening of file and client may have free client case folder, Municipal      Court brochure, MVC-DMV points brochure, and Website brochure;

9.      Review of necessary statutes and case law;

10.    Follow up with Municipal Prosecutor for discovery if suspension or jail is likely;

11.    Prepare defense and mitigating factors;

12.    Miscellaneous correspondence, preparation and drafting of pleadings and legal   documents in contested serious cases;

13.    Review documents supplied by client and court;

14.    Travel to Municipal Court

15.    Negotiations with the Prosecutor and Representation in Municipal Court.

16.    Preparation of End of Case Letter and client questionnaire.

17.    Free Brochures provided on other legal topics such as Worker's Comp, Wills, Personal Injury

18.    Free  monthly update e-mail newsletter. Provide your email address;

19.    Follow up telephone advice [If you call, provide the specific questions with the message].

20.    Invitation to annual client socials/ seminars and Community events via email.

21.    Hold and maintain file for seven years in storage as free client service.

When your job or driver's license is in jeopardy or you are facing thousands of dollars in fines, surcharges and car insurance increases, you need excellent legal representation.

Kenneth Vercammen & Associates, P.C.

2053 Woodbridge Ave.

Edison, NJ 08817

732-572-0500

Toll Free 1-800-NJLAWS7 (1-800-655-2977)

Personal Injury and Criminal on Weekends 732-261-4005

BeNotGuilty. com

State v. David M. Gibson (A-27-12; 070910)

State v. David M. Gibson (A-27-12; 070910)

 There is insufficient evidence in the record to
support a finding that Officer Comegno had probable
cause to arrest Gibson for defiant trespass;
therefore, the subsequent search at the stationhouse
was unconstitutional and the drug evidence seized
during the search must be suppressed. 1-7-14

STATE OF NEW JERSEY V. TIMOTHY ADKINS

STATE OF NEW JERSEY V. TIMOTHY ADKINS
 A-5748-12T4/A-5749-12T4(CONSOLIDATED)

Addressing the impact of Missouri v. McNeely, ___ U.S.
___, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013), on pending
cases involving warrantless blood tests, we reversed a
trial court order suppressing blood evidence in a DWI and
assault-by-auto case. Consistent with long-standing
rulings of the New Jersey Supreme Court, the police
obtained the blood sample from defendant without a search
warrant. Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court
unexpectedly changed the legal landscape by issuing a
ruling that construed the Fourth Amendment more broadly
than our Court.

On these facts, under Davis v. United States, ___ U.S.
___, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 180 L. Ed. 2d 285 (2011), suppression
would not be the appropriate remedy under federal
constitutional law, because the New Jersey police were
acting lawfully under established New Jersey precedent at
the time of the search. Further, had our own Supreme Court
issued the McNeely ruling as a construction of the New
Jersey Constitution, the ruling would not have been applied
retroactively. Under these unusual and very limited
circumstances, we held that suppression of the evidence in
this case was not required. 12/20/13

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. ANGELIQUE STUBBS ET AL.

 STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. ANGELIQUE STUBBS ET AL.
AND STATE VS. JULES L. STUBBS ET AL.
 A-1199-10T2/A-2942-10T2(CONSOLIDATED)

Husband and wife, Jules and Angelique Stubbs, were
convicted of various CDS-related offenses. As to the wife,
we remand for a hearing as to the admissibility of the form
United States Currency Seizure Report, which she signed,
pertaining to $4831 in cash seized from defendants' home
along with a substantial quantity of drugs. The State
argued that the wife, by signing the form, claimed
ownership of the cash, which demonstrated she joined in her
husband's drug-related activities. We conclude the form
must be viewed as an adoptive admission under N.J.R.E.
803(b)(2); and, since the form was a statement of a
criminal defendant, N.J.R.E. 803(b), the State as proponent
was required to show, in a preliminary hearing pursuant to
N.J.R.E. 104(c), that the statement was admissible. To do
so, the State must show the wife was aware of and
understood the contents of the allegedly adopted statement,
and she unambiguously assented to it. We order a new trial
for the wife only if the trial court determines on remand
that the form was not properly admitted as an adoptive
admission. 11-07-13

State v. William O’Driscoll (A-7-12; 070438)

State v. William O’Driscoll (A-7-12; 070438)

The police officer’s errors in the reading of the standard statement informing defendant of the consequences of refusing to provide a breath sample were not material in light of the statutory purpose to inform motorists and impel compliance. The officer’s misstatements could not have reasonably affected defendant’s choice to refuse to provide a breath sample, and do not require reversal of defendant’s conviction for refusal. 9-18-13

State v. Sowell (A-27-11; 068245)

The expert’s opinion regarding the exchange of narcotics was improper because it related to a straightforward factual allegation that was not beyond the understanding of the average juror, and because the expert referred to facts not contained in the hypothetical question. Under the plain error standard, however, defendant’s conviction is affirmed based on the overwhelming evidence of his guilt. 1-14-13

PROFESSIONAL OFFICE SPACE IS AVAILABLE IN EDISON LAW OFFICE

PROFESSIONAL OFFICE SPACE IS AVAILABLE IN EDISON LAW OFFICE

2053 Woodbridge Ave.

Edison, NJ 08817

Excellent space for an Attorney, Financial Planners, Accountant, Insurance Agents, and other Business Professionals as a 2nd location or location to meet clients in Edison.

The offices are located on the 1st floor of the building.

2 rooms office  

office room # 6 approx 12.4 x 9.4       

and front room appr 8 x 9 -office room # 5

plus use of reception room  16.6 x 7.2

and use of storage area in basement

         

$600 per month  [was $700]

Call 732-572-0500

    Owner of building is local attorney, Kenneth Vercammen who handles Personal Injury, Elder Law, and Criminal Law. 

The investigation of a home based on dog sniff was an illegal “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

FLORIDA v. JARDINES

certiorari to the supreme court of florida

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No. 11–564. Argued October 31, 2012—Decided March 26, 2013

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Police took a drug-sniffing dog to Jardines’ front porch, where the dog gave a positive alert for narcotics. Based on the alert, the officers obtained a warrant for a search, which revealed marijuana plants; Jardines was charged with trafficking in cannabis. The Supreme Court of Florida approved the trial court’s decision to suppress the evidence, holding that the officers had engaged in a Fourth Amendment search unsupported by probable cause.

Held: The investigation of Jardines’ home based on dog sniff was an illegal “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 3–10.

(a) When “the Government obtains information by physically intruding” on persons, houses, papers, or effects, “a ‘search’ within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment” has “undoubtedly occurred.” United States v. Jones, 565 U. S. ___, ___, n. 3. Pp. 3–4.

(b) At the Fourth Amendment’s “very core” stands “the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreason-able governmental intrusion.” Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505. The area “immediately surrounding and associated with the home”—the curtilage—is “part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.” Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S. 170. The officers entered the curtilage here: The front porch is the classic exemplar of an area “to which the activity of home life extends.” Id., at 182, n. 12. Pp. 4–5.

(c) The officers’ entry was not explicitly or implicitly invited. Offi-cers need not “shield their eyes” when passing by a home “on public thoroughfares,” California v. Ciraolo, 476 U. S. 207, but “no man can set his foot upon his neighbour’s close without his leave,” Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils. K. B. 275, 291, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817. A police officer not armed with a warrant may approach a home in hopes of speaking to its occupants, because that is “no more than any private citizen might do.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U. S. ___, ___. But the scope of a license is limited not only to a particular area but also to a specific purpose, and there is no customary invitation to enter the curtilage simply to conduct a search. Pp. 5–8.

(d) It is unnecessary to decide whether the officers violated Jardines’ expectation of privacy under Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347. Pp. 8–10.

73 So. 3d 34, affirmed.

Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Thomas, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Kagan, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Ginsburg and Sotomayor, JJ., joined. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy and Breyer, JJ., joined.

US Supreme Court requires warrant before taking of blood in DWI Missouri v McNeely

US Supreme Court requires warrant before taking of blood in DWI Missouri v McNeely __ S. Ct. ___ Decided April 17, 2013 Docket No. 11–1425

Respondent McNeely was stopped by a Missouri police officer for speeding and crossing the centerline. After declining to take a breath test to measure his blood alcohol concentration (BAC), he was arrested and taken to a nearby hospital for blood testing. The officer never attempted to secure a search warrant. McNeely refused to consent to the blood test, but the officer directed a lab technician to take a sample. McNeely’s BAC tested well above the legal limit, and he was charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI). He moved to suppress the blood test result, arguing that taking his blood without a warrant violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court agreed, concluding that the exigency exception to the warrant requirement did not apply because, apart from the fact that McNeely’s blood alcohol was dissipating, no circumstances suggested that the officer faced an emergency. The State Supreme Court affirmed, relying on Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, in which this Court upheld a DWI suspect’s warrantless blood test where the officer “might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened ‘the destruction of evidence,’ ” id., at 770. This case, the state court found, involved a routine DWI investigation where no factors other than the natural dissipation of blood alcohol suggested that there was an emergency, and, thus, the nonconsensual warrantless test violated McNeely’s right to be free from unreasonable searches of his person.

Held: The judgment is affirmed.

358 S. W. 3d 65, affirmed.

Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II–A, II–B, and IV, concluding that in drunk-driving investigations, the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant.  

(a) The principle that a warrantless search of the person is reasonable only if it falls within a recognized exception, see, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, applies here, where the search involved a compelled physical intrusion beneath McNeely’s skin and into his veins to obtain a blood sample to use as evidence in a criminal investigation. One recognized exception “applies when ‘ “the exigencies of the situation” make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable.’ ” Kentucky v. King, 563 U. S. ___, ___. This Court looks to the totality of circumstances in determining whether an exigency exits. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398. Applying this approach in Schmerber, the Court found a warrantless blood test reasonable after considering all of the facts and circumstances of that case and carefully basing its holding on those specific facts, including that alcohol levels decline after drinking stops and that testing was delayed while officers transported the injured suspect to the hospital and investigated the accident scene.  

(b) The State nonetheless seeks a per se rule, contending that exigent circumstances necessarily exist when an officer has probable cause to believe a person has been driving under the influence of alcohol because BAC evidence is inherently evanescent. Though a person’s blood alcohol level declines until the alcohol is eliminated, it does not follow that the Court should depart from careful case-by-case assessment of exigency. When officers in drunk-driving investigations can reasonably obtain a warrant before having a blood sample drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451. Circumstances may make obtaining a warrant impractical such that the alcohol’s dissipation will support an exigency, but that is a reason to decide each case on its facts, as in Schmerber, not to accept the “considerable overgeneralization” that a per se rule would reflect, Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U. S. 385. Blood testing is different in critical respects from other destruction-of-evidence cases. Unlike a situation where, e.g., a suspect has control over easily disposable evidence, see Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, BAC evidence naturally dissipates in a gradual and relatively predictable manner. Moreover, because an officer must typically take a DWI suspect to a medical facility and obtain a trained medical professional’s assistance before having a blood test conducted, some delay between the time of the arrest or accident and time of the test is inevitable regardless of whether a warrant is obtained. The State’s rule also fails to account for advances in the 47 years since Schmerber was decided that allow for the more expeditious processing of warrant applications, particularly in contexts like drunk-driving investigations where the evidence supporting probable cause is simple. The natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood may support an exigency finding in a specific case, as it did in Schmerber, but it does not do so categorically.  

(c) Because the State sought a per se rule here, it did not argue that there were exigent circumstances in this particular case. The arguments and the record thus do not provide the Court with an adequate framework for a detailed discussion of all the relevant factors that can be taken into account in determining the reasonableness of acting without a warrant. It suffices to say that the metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream and the ensuing loss of evidence are among the factors that must be considered in deciding whether a warrant is required.  

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Scalia, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Kagan, concluded in Part III that other arguments advanced by the State and amici in support of a per se rule are unpersuasive. Their concern that a case-by-case approach to exigency will not provide adequate guidance to law enforcement officers may make the desire for a bright-line rule understandable, but the Fourth Amendment will not tolerate adoption of an overly broad categorical approach in this context. A fact-intensive, totality of the circumstances, approach is hardly unique within this Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U. S. 119–125. They also contend that the privacy interest implicated here is minimal. But motorists’ diminished expectation of privacy does not diminish their privacy interest in preventing a government agent from piercing their skin. And though a blood test conducted in a medical setting by trained personnel is less intrusive than other bodily invasions, this Court has never retreated from its recognition that any compelled intrusion into the human body implicates significant, constitutionally protected privacy interests. Finally, the government’s general interest in combating drunk driving does not justify departing from the warrant requirement without showing exigent circumstances that make securing a warrant impractical in a particular case.

Eligibilities issues for Drug Court and Reasons for Rejection

Eligibilities issues for Drug Court and  Reasons for Rejection
(5)the person did not possess a firearm at the time of the present offense and did not possess a firearm at the time of any pending criminal charge; and [NOT ELIGIBLE IF FIREARM]

(6)the person has not been previously convicted on two or more separate occasions of crimes of the first or second degree, other than those listed in paragraph (7); or the person has not been previously convicted on two or more separate occasions, where one of the offenses is a crime of the third degree, other than crimes defined in N.J.S.2C:35-10, and one of the offenses is a crime of the first or second degree; and

(7)the person has not been previously convicted or adjudicated delinquent for, and does not have a pending charge of murder, aggravated manslaughter, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, aggravated sexual assault or sexual assault, or a similar crime under the laws of any other state or the United States; and [NOT ELIGIBLE IF PRIOR CONVICTION]
........

(9)no danger to the community will result from the person being placed on special probation pursuant to this section.

NJAC 10A:31-25.17 Orientation

NJAC 10A:31-25.17 Orientation
TITLE 10A. CORRECTIONS  
CHAPTER 31. ADULT COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES  
SUBCHAPTER 25. WORK AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING RELEASE PROGRAM
N.J.A.C. 10A:31-25.17 (2012)
   (a) When the inmate has been accepted into the Work Release Program and the appropriate applications and plans have been completed, the County Work Release Administrator shall provide an orientation to the inmate.

(b) The orientation shall ensure that the inmate is made aware of and has a clear understanding of the rules, regulations and conditions governing the Work Release Program.

(c) The County Work Release Administrator or designee shall also ensure that the employer is made aware of the rules and regulations and of the employer's responsibilities concerning the Work Release Program.

(d) The County Work Release Administrator shall make periodic evaluations of the extent of family needs and of job and vocational training sites to ensure that the rules and regulations governing the Work Release Program are not being violated.

 
HISTORY:

Amended by R.2000 d.332, effective August 7, 2000.

See: 32 New Jersey Register 1894(a), 32 New Jersey Register 2945(a).

NJAC 10A:31-25.16 Custody status

NJAC 10A:31-25.16 Custody status
TITLE 10A. CORRECTIONS  
CHAPTER 31. ADULT COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES  
SUBCHAPTER 25. WORK AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING RELEASE PROGRAM
N.J.A.C. 10A:31-25.16 (2012)
   Inmates approved for outside employment, family care or vocational training under a Work Release Program shall be classified as minimum custody and housed separately from other inmates serving terms in ordinary confinement, if possible.

NJAC 10A:31-25.14 Family Need Release Plan

NJAC 10A:31-25.14 Family Need Release Plan
TITLE 10A. CORRECTIONS  
CHAPTER 31. ADULT COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES  SUBCHAPTER 25. WORK AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING RELEASE PROGRAM
N.J.A.C. 10A:31-25.14 (2012)

   (a) A detailed Family Need Release Plan (Form CWR-6 Family Need Release Plan) shall be prepared by the County Work Release Administrator with a copy to the inmate outlining the following:

1. The nature of need;

2. The location of where family need is to be served;

3. The dates and times of leaving and returning to the adult county correctional facility;

4. The times of arrival and departure from the family need site;

5. The mode of transportation; and

6. Other pertinent data including responsibility for paying costs, such as transportation, meals, etc.

 
HISTORY:

Amended by R.2000 d.332, effective August 7, 2000.

See: 32 New Jersey Register 1894(a), 32 New Jersey Register 2945(a).

NJAC 10A:31-25.12 Statement of disbursements

NJAC 10A:31-25.12 Statement of disbursements
TITLE 10A. CORRECTIONS  
CHAPTER 31. ADULT COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES  
SUBCHAPTER 25. WORK AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING RELEASE PROGRAM
N.J.A.C. 10A:31-25.12 (2012)  
   (a) An inmate participating in the Work Release Program shall receive a statement on Form CWR-4, Statement of Disbursements, itemizing deductions made from each pay check within two weeks of the county's receipt of the paycheck.

(b) The statement shall report all income and expenses and accurately reflect the statement of the inmate's account for the period covered.

 
HISTORY:

Amended by R.2000 d.332, effective August 7, 2000.

See: 32 New Jersey Register 1894(a), 32 New Jersey Register 2945(a).

NJAC 10A:31-25.11 Disbursement of wages

NJAC 10A:31-25.11 Disbursement of wages 
TITLE 10A. CORRECTIONS  
CHAPTER 31. ADULT COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES  
SUBCHAPTER 25. WORK AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING RELEASE PROGRAM
N.J.A.C. 10A:31-25.11 (2012) NJAC 10A:31-25.11 Disbursement of wages 

   (a) An inmate participating in the Work Release Program shall submit his or her salary, wages or stipend, in the form that it is paid (cash or check), to the County Work Release Administrator who shall, in accordance with N.J.S.A. 30:4-91.4 and applicable provisions of related State statutes, make payments from these earnings for:

1. Money advances made to purchase or redeem work clothes, travel clothes and/or work tools;

2. The cost of work transportation and cash advanced for miscellaneous daily expenses while outside the adult county correctional facility;

3. Payment of cost for board which shall be charged for each day that the inmate is participating in the Work Release Program;

4. Court costs and fines;

5. Medical and dental fees;

6. Prescription or nonprescription drugs or medicine fees;

7. Legally ascertained support of dependents after written notice to the appropriate welfare board; and/or

8. Payment on debts and legal obligations acknowledged by the inmate in writing and filed with the County Work Release Administrator on such forms as the Administrator shall specify.

(b) Every effort shall be made to secure full payment of advances as soon as possible. Except in the most unusual situations, full repayment shall be obtained no later than the second full pay.

(c) Any balance of earnings remaining after payment of items in (a) above shall be retained as required by N.J.S.A. 30:8-49(4), and paid to the inmate when he or she is discharged.

(d) Staff from each county shall develop a written system whereby each inmate participating in the Work Release Program shall pay a fair percentage of his or her earnings for board. The daily per capita rate for the payment of board shall not include any part of the costs arising from the administration of the Work Release Program.

 
HISTORY:

Amended by R.2000 d.332, effective August 7, 2000.

See: 32 N.J.R. 1894(a), 32 N.J.R. 2945(a).

In (a), inserted N.J.S.A. reference in the introductory paragraph, inserted 5 and 6, and recodified former 5 and 6 as 7 and 8.

Amended by R.2006 d.59, effective February 6, 2006.

See: 37 N.J.R. 3201(a), 38 N.J.R. 995(a).