The Police cannot pull over a car without probable cause
The Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The
New Jersey Constitution (1947, Article 1, Paragraph 7) prohibits any
unreasonable searches and seizures and guarantees to the people the same rights
as the Federal Constitution.
When
evidence is seized or even a car is stopped without a warrant or violation, the
burden of proof is upon the state to prove that there was no Fourth Amendment
violation. State v. Brown, 132 N.J. Super. (App. Div.
1975). The state must prove that there
was no Fourth Amendment violation by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Whittington, 142 N.J. Super.
45 (App. Div. 1976). Such searches are
presumptively invalid and the State carries the burden of proof of legality. State
v Valencia 93 NJ 126, 133 (1983), State v. Brown, supra.; State
v. Welsh, 84 N.J. 348, (1980). In the absence of a valid exception to the
requirement for a search warrant, a search conducted without a warrant is per
se unreasonable. Schnekloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218,219, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed 2d
854, 858 (1973)
Enforcement
of the federally created rights has been effected by rendering the fruits of
unconstitutional searches inadmissible in associated criminal court
proceedings, Weeks v United States
232 US 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed 652 (1914). These restrictions are
applicable to the states, Mapp v Ohio,
367 US 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed 2d 1081 (1961).
State
judges, no less than federal judges, have the high responsibility for
protecting constitutional rights. While they are disturbed to allow defendants
to go unprosecuted, their oath of office requires them to continue the
guarantees afforded by the Constitution.
As explained in Weeks, supra,:
The
efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be
aided by the
sacrifice of those great principles established by
years of endeavor
and suffering which have resulted in their
embodiment in the
fundamental law of the land. Weeks v United States 232 US 383,393,
34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed 652 (1914).
Independently
of federally mandated rights, each state has the power to impose higher
standards on searches and seizures under dictate law than is required by the
federal constitution, PruneYard Shopping Center v Robins 447 US 74, 81
(1980); State v Johnson 68 NJ
349, 353 (1975). In fact, New Jersey has chosen to afford to the accused in the
search and seizure area greater rights than those deemed mandated by the United
States Constitution. State v Alston,
88 NJ 21 (1981); State v Novembrino 220 NJ Super. 229, 240-243 (App.
Div. 1985), aff'd 105 NJ 95 (1987).
Courts
are to afford liberal, not grudging enforcement of the Fourth Amendment. We do
not have one law of search and seizure for narcotics and gambling cases and
another for breaking and entering and theft. The meanness of the offender or
the gravity of his crime does not decrease, but rather accentuates the duty of
the courts to uphold and dispassionately apply the settled judicial criteria
for lawful searches under the Amendment. For it is the hard case which
sometimes proves the Achilles' heal of constitutional rights, even as it tends
to make bad law in other areas. State v Naturile 83 NJ Super. 563, 579
(App. Div. 1964).
POINT 2
POLICE CANNOT STOP AND SEARCH ANY CARS WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE
The
United States Supreme Court has declared that random stops for license and
registration checks violate the Fourth Amendment prohibition against
unreasonable searches. Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1401, 59 L.Ed. 2d 660, 674
(1979); State v. Patino, 83 N.J. 1 (1980).
There was no indication that motor vehicle laws were violated or that
any other laws were violated. Therefore,
the police officers violated the constitutional rights of defendant by ordering
him to exit the vehicle so the police on
the scene could conduct warrantless searches.
State v. Patino, 163 N.J. Super.
116, 125 (App. Div. 1970) aff'd 83 N.J. 1 (1980) prohibited a stop where
the court found "in sum, the search was purely investigatory and the seizure
a product of luck and hunch, a combination of insufficient constitutional
ingredients."
Automobiles
are areas of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. State v. Patino, supra.;
State v. Williams, 163 N.J. Super. 352, 356 (App. Div. 1979). New Jersey Courts have held that Article 1,
Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution affords greater protection than the
Fourth Amendment. State v. Davis,
104 N.J. 490 (1986), State v. Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. 28, 35 (App. Div. 1985). The burden is on the State to prove an
exception to the warrant requirement showing the need for the search. State v. Welsh, 84 N.J. at 852. Understandable, professional curiosity is not
sufficient justification for an intrusion on a constitutionally protected
automobile. State v. Patino, supra. In the case at bar, the search of the vehicle
and seizure of evidence were unconstitutional.
Therefore, the evidence obtained in that seizure must be suppressed.
Cases
Prohibit Searches Without A Warrant
Community
care-taking does not permit a search of a car. State v Costa
327 NJ Super
22 (App. Div. 1999)
Although a police officer
might have the authority to stop a driver and a passenger alighting from an
automobile on a private parking lot to inquire as to why the driver and his
passenger had been sitting in the parked vehicle, the officer's subsequent
investigation elevated the encounter to a detention, which was unsupported by
an articulable suspicion, thus rendering the driver's consent to search
void. We reject the State's contention
that the officer's stop of both men was in conformity with its community
care-taking function.
Request for Credentials is a
Stop. State v. Egan 325 NJ Super. 402 (Law Div. 1999).
Unsupported
by probable cause or reasonable suspicion, a police officer's request of
credentials from the driver of a parked vehicle constituted a "stop";
was more than minimally necessary to dispel the officer's naked suspicion; and
not justifiable as a "field inquiry."
The fruits of the stop are, therefore, suppressed.
MV Stop Not Permitted on Community
Caretaking. State v. Cryan 320 NJ Super. 325 (App. Div. 1999).
A motor vehicle stop may not be based
on community caretaking grounds where the officer stopped the defendant because,
at 4 a.m., the defendant did not proceed for five seconds after a traffic light
turned green.
Legally parked car no grounds for search. State in the Interest of A.P. 315 NJ
Super. 166 (Law Div. 1998).
Here, where the juvenile was a passenger in a legally parked
car and the officer who approached him to make a community - care-taking
inquiry, as opposed to a lawful stop based on a traffic violation, had no prior
knowledge of the juvenile, and there was no criminal activity in the area and no
signs of alcohol or a controlled dangerous substance, the juvenile's furtive
movements in avoiding eye contact with the officer did not provide a basis for
an objective reasonable and articulable suspicion, and the evidence seized (a
lighter and a "pipe-like smoking device") must be suppressed; the
issue of whether or not the juvenile's statement to the officer that he did not
lean forward and down as the officer approached was a lie which would justify a
suspicion that he might be armed, is subject to ambiguity and
interpretation.
Police cannot Search for Driver
Identification in Minor Motor Vehicle Stop. State v. Lark 163 NJ 294
(2000).
Under
the federal and state constitutions, following a motor vehicle stop for a minor
traffic violation, a police officer may not enter the vehicle to search for
proof of the driver's identity even though the driver has failed to produce his
driver's license and may have lied about his identity. The officers lacked probable cause to believe
a crime had been committed. The dictum
in State v. Boykins, 50 N.J. 73 (1967), does not authorize the
search.
Search
not permitted for speeding ticket. Knowles
v. Iowa 525 U.S. 113, 119 S.
Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492, 67 U.S.L.W. 4027 (1998). (Unanimous U.S. Supreme Court decision -
Justice Rehnquist).
Since searches incident to traffic
citations are not required either to protect an officer's safety or to discover
and preserve evidence, there is no justification for an exception to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement. Suppression granted.