Top Municipal Court cases 2017
1. Police could not stop for only
one broken taillight
State v. Sutherland
2. Confession suppressed where Spanish translation not accurate
State v A.M.
3. Evidence here should not have
been excluded where lab report not yet provided by lab
State v Washington
4. Guilty plea could be withdrawn
here where defendant claimed innocence at sentencing
State v Belton
5. Restraining order should not be issued if domestic violence not
proved
M.C. VS. G.T.
6. Hearsay is generally admissible in a VOP
hearing
State v. Mosley
7. Police have
duty to preserve video and evidence
State v Richardson
8. Odor of pot
does not police to search the trunk without consent or warrant
State v. Houston
9. PCR rejected here after 7 years
State v. Siervo
10. Case addresses
warrantless sweep of vehicle
State v. Mills
11. Officer writing refusal as 39:4-50.2 rather
than N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a. does not dismiss refusal State v. Dito
12. Photo Lt.
General Christopher Burne 3 star Air Force General
13. Col. (Ret.)
Danny McKnight, author Streets Of Mogadishu and Combat hero
Colonel from Black Hawk Down
1. Police could not stop for only
one broken taillight
State v. Sutherland
The Appellate Division erred in
concluding that the holding in State v Heien is applicable here. The
motor vehicle statutes pertinent here are not ambiguous. The officer’s stop of
defendant’s motor vehicle was not an objectively reasonable mistake of law that
gave rise to constitutional reasonable suspicion; the stop was therefore
unconstitutional.
Defendant’s traffic stop was premised on perceived
violations of two statutes. The statutes read together require that a motor
vehicle only have two working rear lamps, with at least one working lamp on
each side. See N.J.S.A. 39:3-61(a); N.J.S.A. 39:3-66. N.J.S.A. 39:3-66 mandates
that the lamps “required by this article” must be kept in good working order.
The statutes require one working taillight on each side of a vehicle. Thus, if
a vehicle has two taillights on each side of the vehicle—more than the law
requires—and one of those multiple taillights on one side is not working, a
violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-61(a) and -66, as was assumed and charged here, has
not occurred. The officer’s erroneous application of the functioning taillight
requirement was not an objectively reasonable mistake of law. This case does
not present a basis for considering the application of Heien. Simply put, this
was not a good stop. The judgment of the Appellate Division, premised on an
application of Heien to the stop in this matter, is reversed.
The State also
asserted community caretaking as an alternative basis to support the stop. The
Appellate Division did not reach the argument in light of the manner in which
it resolved the case. Accordingly, a remand is appropriate to allow the
Appellate Division to address the unresolved argument advanced by the
State. (A-14-16; 077807)
2. Confession suppressed where Spanish translation not accurate
State v A.M.
Defendant pled guilty to second-degree
sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(4), reserving his right to appeal the
denial of his motion to suppress the inculpatory statement. This court reverses
the trial court's order denying defendant's motion to suppress his inculpatory
statement. The evidence presented by the State at the N.J.R.E. 104(c) hearing
does not support the motion judge's findings that the State satisfied "the
heavy burden" of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant made a
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary decision to waive his constitutional rights
under Miranda. The motion judge's decision upholding the methods used by the
interrogating detectives improperly shifted this burden of proof to defendant.
Judge Fuentes wrote a separate concurrence addressing
the use of police officers as interpreters when interrogating a suspect who is
limited English proficient. A-2090-13T2
3. Evidence here should not have
been excluded where lab report not yet provided by lab to pros
State v Washington
The Appellate Division ruled that the State Police Lab's draft
DNA report was not "within the possession, custody or control of the
prosecutor" until the lab sent it to the county prosecutor, and in any
event was not discoverable until the report was reviewed and approved by the
lab. R. 3:13-3(b)(1)(C). Regardless of the speedy trial provisions, the court
abused its discretion by excluding the DNA evidence rather than granting a
continuance of trial under Rule 3:13-3(b)(1)(I) and -3(f), given the evidence's
importance and the absence of surprise, prejudice, or a design to
mislead.
Under the speedy trial rule and statute, a case may be
"complex" if it has "complicated evidence," but time is
excludable only if the complexity makes it unreasonable to expect adequate
preparation for trial in the speedy trial period. R. 3:5-4(i)(7); N.J.S.A.
2A:162-22(b)(1)(g). The provision addressing failures to produce discovery is a
limit on excludable time. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-22(b)(2). The court properly excluded
time sua sponte under N.J.S.A. 2A:162-22(b)(1)(c), and retained jurisdiction to
do so after the State sought and obtained leave to appeal. That provision
excludes the time while an emergent relief request, or interlocutory appeal, is
pending in this court. Time while the trial is stayed is excludable under
N.J.S.A. 2A:162-22(b)(1)(l).
4. Guilty plea could be withdrawn
here where defendant claimed innocence at sentencing
State v Belton
In this PCR appeal, defendant
collaterally challenged his conviction, after a guilty plea, to aggravated
manslaughter. The panel concludes that defendant, in the course of his
allocution, suggested a defense of others that was inconsistent with guilt; his
waiver of that defense was not knowingly made; therefore, he did not present a
sufficient factual basis of guilt. In reaching this conclusion, the panel
applies the principles set forth in State v. Urbina, 221 N.J. 509 (2015),
although that case involved a claim of self-defense, rather than the defense of
others, suggested in the course of a guilty plea. In view of defendant's
contemporaneous claim of innocence, the panel held that the failure to elicit a
sufficient factual basis was of constitutional dimension and warrants PCR.
A-0971-16T1
5. Restraining order should not be issued if domestic violence not
proved
M.C. VS. G.T.
Plaintiff failed to prove defendant
committed an act of domestic violence but the judge – after acknowledging the
Prevention of Domestic Violence Act did not permit issuance of a final
restraining order – relied on P.J.G. v. P.S.S., 297 N.J. Super. 468 (App. Div. 1997), invoked her
"inherent equitable powers," and entered restraints in plaintiff's
favor.
The court reversed, holding that even if
it represents good law, P.J.G. requires that some other vehicle – such as
another pending action between the parties – must be available for the issuance
of restraints based on the trial court's inherent equitable powers. There being
no action between the parties except the domestic violence action in question,
the trial court was not authorized to impose restraints or do anything but
dismiss plaintiff's domestic violence action without granting affirmative
relief. A-4781-15T4
6. Hearsay is generally admissible in a VOP
hearing
State v. Mosley App. Div.
Hearsay
is generally admissible in a VOP hearing. When assessing the State’s ability to
rely on hearsay to satisfy its proof obligation without contravening a
defendant’s due process rights, a court fundamentally should consider the
State’s reasons for relying on hearsay forms of evidence and the reliability of
the evidence for its proposed purpose. In this matter, the State failed to
provide any justification for relying on hearsay, and the hearsay evidence was
not sufficiently reliable for its asserted purpose of substantiating the new
criminal charges against defendant. A-24-16;
7. Police have
duty to preserve video and evidence
State v Richardson unreported
The court
reverses defendant's drug possession conviction and holds that when the State
refuses a defense attorney's diligent pre-indictment request to preserve and
produce recordings, which the State or its law enforcement agencies created and
are directly relevant to adjudicating an existing charge, the defendant is
entitled to an adverse inference charge.
In this drug
case, despite the attorney's timely preservation request, the State allowed the
automatic erasure of a booking room video that likely recorded the search of
defendant, which allegedly uncovered the drugs he was charged with possessing.
The court also holds the court erred by allowing the State to introduce
evidence that defendant gave a false name during the earlier traffic stop. Unreported
A-2023-15T2 (App. Div. 2017) source
https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/almID/1202800182543/State-v-Richardson/?mcode=1391052443336&curindex=65
8. Odor of pot
does not police to search the trunk without consent or warrant
State v. Houston unreported App
Div.
During a motor vehicle stop, officers observed
respondent was not wearing a seatbelt and also detected the smell of burnt
marijuana once respondent lowered the window. The officers removed respondent
from the car and placed him under arrest after a search of his person produced
five prescription pills, along with a large sum of money. During a search of
the vehicle, officers found additional pills and marijuana. On motion to
suppress evidence, the trial court concluded the "vehicle stop was
lawful" because officers "observed motor vehicle violations."
Additionally, the seizure of the burnt marijuana cigarette in the ashtray was
"valid pursuant to a search incident to arrest," and because it was
in "plain view."
However, the trial judge held the officers had no
right to search the backpack or its contents, "or disassemble the car
parts which covered the voids and the air vents of the car" without a warrant
as respondent was handcuffed and removed from the car with no ability to
destroy potential evidence.
On appeal, the court was tasked with determining
whether the search exceeded the permissible scope pursuant to the automobile
exception. Despite the unsettled landscape in prior precedents, the court
reversed in part finding that the officers had authority to conduct a search of
the passenger compartment of the vehicle based upon probable cause. Having
found the partially smoked marijuana cigarette, as well as the baby bottles
filled with suspected controlled substances in the passenger compartment, the
officers had probable cause to search the contents of the backpack.
However, the court affirmed suppression of the
contraband found in the wheel panels as the automobile exception did not
authorize such a search that "transcended all bounds of
reasonableness." Docket A-0023-17T3 source https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/almID/1513134731NJA002317T/
9. PCR rejected here after 7 years
State v. Siervo App. Div. unreported
More than
seven years after pleading guilty in municipal court to two motor vehicle
violations - driving while intoxicated and refusing to submit to a breath test
- appellant sought to withdraw his pleas. Before accepting appellant's plea,
the municipal court judge questioned appellant to assure he was entering the
plea knowingly and voluntarily. Both the municipal court and the Law Division
denied his application; the Law Division judge found the application was
time-barred by Rule 3:22-12, which required, with certain exceptions, that a
defendant file a first petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) not more than
five years after a judgment of conviction was entered.
On appeal, appellant argued that the factual
basis for his guilty plea did not set forth the essential elements of the
offense and his motion was not governed by the time limitations of PCR. The
court affirmed concluding appellant's application to withdraw his guilty plea
was time-barred and his application did not fall within an exception to the
statute of limitations. The court further remarked that the rules vest
discretion in the respective courts to permit a defendant to make a
post-sentence motion to withdraw a plea if doing so will correct a manifest
injustice. Considering the problems caused by the passage of significant time
following appellant's guilty pleas, appellant's non-assertion of innocence or
misunderstanding of the nature of the charges, and the trial court's
determination of appellant's motivation, appellant's motion to withdraw his
pleas did not constitute manifest injustice. Accordingly, the court affirmed. A-0989-16T2
10. Case addresses
warrantless sweep of vehicle
State
v. Mills unreported App. Div.
Following the trial court’s denial of his
motion to suppress incriminating evidence that police had seized in a
warrantless car search. On appeal,
appellant contended that the warrantless search of the car in which he had been
riding as a passenger was unconstitutional. He further submitted that the trial
court erred in rejecting his request to draw an adverse inference against
respondent for failure to preserve two separate video recordings of the vehicle
stop. The court remanded the suppression issues to the trial court for
reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in State v.
Robinson, 228 N.J. 529 (2017) which illuminated the requirements for
a permissible warrantless “protective sweep” of a vehicle.
The court noted the record, including a DVD of
the video recording, presented to the motion judge were unable to resolve
fact-laden matters conclusively as to whether the officers had the legality to
conduct a warrantless protective sweep of the vehicle. As such, the appropriate
course of action was to remand the matter to reconsider its original
suppression ruling. However, the court affirmed denial of an adverse inference
as the failure to preserve the recording was not intentionally done to
prejudice appellant’s rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and
remanded in part. 14-2-4387 Source https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/almID/1507104105NewJerseyLawJournalA125815T1/
11. Officer writing refusal as 39:4-50.2 rather
than N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a. does not dismiss refusal State v. Dito
unreported App.
Div.
An officer issued respondent a summons for driving while intoxicated and
for refusal to submit to a breath test. Respondent moved to dismiss the refusal
charge on the ground that the summons referenced N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2 rather than
N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a. Following the municipal court judge's denial of his
motion, respondent pled guilty to both charges. On appeal, the law division
judge found that respondent's summons for refusal to submit the breath test had
incorrectly cited the statutory authority; the judge concluded that the error
was fatal as it failed to inform respondent of the nature of the charge against
him. Appellant now argued that the law division judge erred by dismissing the
summons as it provided respondent with adequate notice of the charge and the
penalties he faced if found guilty of refusal.
The court reversed finding the trial court erred by concluding that the
summons issued was fatally flawed for its incorrect statutory citation. Since
the elements of refusal were found in both statutes, the citation of only the
N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2 did not require dismissal of the summons. The court noted
that dismissal of the charges under these circumstances would exalt form over
substance, an approach the courts have properly rejected. Moreover, respondent
was not prejudiced or denied due process as the record showed the officer read
respondent the Attorney General's standard statement, thereby informing
respondent that if he failed to submit to the breath test, he would be charged
with refusal. Accordingly, the court reversed. Docket A-2699-16T3 source https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/almID/1515728233NJA269916T/
Photo
Lt. General
Christopher Burne 3 star Air Force General
Lt. General
Christopher Burne with Ken V at NJ Bar Assoc Veterans Affairs Symposium. Both
went to University of Scranton. He is a 3 star General and Scranton class of
1980. Ken V was co-captain of Scranton cross-country and class of 1981.
