Miranda applies not only upon arrest, but
also upon custodial interrogation
It is
fundamental that Miranda Warnings are required when a person is subject to
"custodial interrogation." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L. Ed.2d 694, 706 (1966).
"Custodial
interrogation" has been defined as "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id.
In State
v. Cunningham, 153 N.J. Super. 350, 352-353, (App. Div. 1977), the Court (citing
People v. Stewart, 62 400 P.2d 97, 102 (1965)), said:
The test ... does not propose a
determination of the actual intent or subjective purpose of the police in
undertaking the interrogations but a determination based upon the objective
evidence.
A defendant
is in "custody" for purposes of Miranda if the actions of the
interrogating officers and the surrounding circumstances, fairly construed,
would reasonably lead a detainee to believe he was not free to leave. State
v. Barnes, 54 N.J. 1, 6 (1969) cert. den. 396 U.S. 1029, 90 S. Ct.
580, 24 L.Ed.2d 525 (1970). As such, the inquiry has been characterized as an
"objective reasonable man" test. Id.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the use
of involuntary statements and confessions at trial. The State bears the burden
of proof in a motion to suppress a statement allegedly obtained in violation of
the Miranda doctrine. New Jersey requires
the higher standard of beyond a reasonable doubt when the court determines if
Miranda has not been fully complies
with. State v Yough, 49 NJ 587, 600-601
(1967), State v Whittington 142 NJ
Super. 45, 49-50 (App. Div. 1976), State v Flower 224 NJ Super. 208, 213 (Law
Div 1987) aff'd per curiam 224 NJ Super.
90 (App. Div. 1988).
Absent Miranda
Warnings to a defendant who is in custody, the prosecution may not use a
defendant's answers to questions. State v. Hartley, 103 N.J. 252, 275
(1986). A valid waiver of a defendant's constitutional rights must be made
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently - the State bears that burden of that
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384
U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 134 (1988)
A violation of
Miranda does not throw out an arrest. The Miranda violation only makes the
verbal statements not admissible at trial
WHAT IS INTERROGATION?
As set forth in NJ Practice, Vol. 32
Criminal Practice and Procedure (West
1998) Section 755, in Rhode Island V Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297
(1980) the United States Supreme Court held that the term
"interrogation" under Miranda refers not only to express questioning
but also to any words or actions on the part of the police that the police
should know are reasonably likely to elicit, an incriminating response from the
suspect.
It is "an established principle of
our federalist system" that states may afford "individual liberties
more expansive than those afforded by the federal constitution." State
v Novembrino 105 NJ 95, 144-145 (1987).
Generally, a statement given by a
defendant is not admissible in a criminal case unless the court is satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was informed of his Miranda rights before giving the statement
and "in light of all the circumstances attending the confession it was
given voluntarily." State v Hampton, 61 NJ 250, 272 (1972). What is
at stake is ensuring the use of effective procedural safeguards to secure the
right of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution that " no
person shall be.... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself," which is now made applicable to state action by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, once informed of his rights "
a defendant may waive effectuation of these rights provided the waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." State v Flower 224 NJ
Super. 208, 213 (Law Div 1987) aff'd per curiam
224 NJ Super. 90 (App. Div. 1988). citing Miranda v Arizona 384 US 436, 444, 86 S. Ct 1602, 1612, 16 L.
Ed 2d 694 (1966); emphasis in Flowers.
In
State v Flower 224 NJ Super. 208, 213 (Law Div 1987) aff'd per
curiam 224 NJ Super. 90 (App. Div.
1988), the defendant had a low IQ and limited vocabulary. He gave confessions
to police and a confession to DYFS. The court excluded the confession to the
police, even though Miranda warnings were given and there was lack of coercion
and an admitted waiver of rights by the defendant. The court concluded
that since the Defendant could not
understand his Miranda rights, he could not waive them. One cannot
knowingly and intelligently waive a right that he cannot understand or
appreciate. 224 NJ Super. at 216. The court also excluded confessions to a DYFS
investigator on the same grounds since she was acting in a law enforcement
capacity and failed to inform Defendant of his Miranda rights. Id at
220.
Where it is charged that a confession
was given under the influence of narcotics or during a withdrawal period,
central question of voluntariness remains the same, and the trial court must scrutinize
all the pertinent facts attending the confession with particular focus on
Defendant's demeanor, coherence, articulateness, capacity to full use of his
faculties, his memory and his overall intelligence. State v Arcediano 371 F. Supp. 457 (D.
NJ 1974); See also Wade v Yeager
245 F. Supp 62 (D. NJ 1964).
The State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the waiver was made knowingly and intelligently. If the suspect is intoxicated or under the
influence of drugs to the point that he cannot understand his constitutional
rights, then any waiver is void. If the
suspect is suffering from a mental disability, which renders him incapable of
understanding his constitutional rights, then any waiver is void. The level of mental disability which would
render a suspect incapable of understanding his constitutional rights is
probably close to the point at which the suspect could be said to be incapable
of managing his own affairs.
Where circumstances cast doubt on
knowing and intelligent quality of alleged
waiver of right to counsel, there can be no waiver. State vs. Dickens 192 NJ Super. 290
(App. Div. 1983).
Intoxication is grounds to suppress
statements. See e.g. Common vs.
Brithsher 563 A.2d 502, App granted
575 A.2d 107. (If Defendant's intoxication combined to render him incapable of
understanding Miranda warning waiver of Miranda rights would be invalid); Common vs. Andel 477 A.2d 13 56
(1984); (Defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights was vitiated by his
intoxication, his eyes glaring and had a
strong odor of alcohol. Statements made
by defendant while in custody should suppressed.)
The court has always set high standards
of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights Johnson vs. Zerbst 304 US 458 58 S. Court 1019, 82 Ed 146
(1938). In Common vs. Hosey 334 NE 2d 44 ( Mass 75 ) the court reversed
and remanded a matter where tried judge allowed admission of defendant's
statement to police where defendant was extremely high, extremely emotional and
detected from reality.
Due process requires not only that a conviction not be based on an
involuntary confession but also that a trial court hold what has become known
as a Jackson Denno hearing when a defendant contests the voluntariness of his
statement. Miller vs. Dugger 838
F. 2d 1530 ( 11 Cir. 1988) cert. den 486 US 1061. 1085.S. Ct. 2832 100 L. Ed 2d 933 (1988).
A Jackson-Denno hearing refers to the court proceeding determining
whether a defendant’s confession was voluntary or involuntary, based on Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). At
the Jackson- Denno hearing and at oral argument, we will explain through
cross-examination and witnesses the involuntary nature of any statements the
state intends to produce.
Criminal Lawyers
Job ABA p40
Issues to
determine if defendant was “in custody”
Was defendant
free to leave?
Was defendant
put in handcuffs?
Was he in patrol
car?
Was he in police
station?
Was he free to
leave police station?
Was he given
Miranda warning?
Respectfully submitted
KENNETH A. VERCAMMEN
ATTORNEY AT LAW
