Driving under the influence not a violation of
DWI law in NJ. See [State v. Machuzak, 227 N.J. Super. 279 (1988); State v.
Johnson, 203 N.J. Super. 436 (1985)]
227 N.J. Super. 279 (1988)
546 A.2d 1099
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
PLAINTIFF, v. DANIEL MACHUZAK, DEFENDANT.
Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division Somerset County.
Decided April 18, 1988.
PAUL T. MURPHY, J.S.C.
The defendant, Daniel
Machuzak, was convicted in the Municipal Court, Montgomery Township, for
driving while intoxicated in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. The statute under
which defendant was convicted, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, provides that a person who
operates a motor vehicle while intoxicated shall be subject to penalty,
including fines, community service, imprisonment and revocation of license. At
the time of his arrest, defendant was operating a nonmotorized, pedal-type
bicycle. Defendant appeals his conviction.
*281 A trial de novo was
held on April 8, 1988. This Court reserved decision. Defendant does not deny
his intoxication, rather the issue before this Court is whether the operator of
a pedal bicycle falls within the purview of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. For authority on
this issue, the Court is faced with two conflicting Law Division cases which
have not been resolved by any Appellate authority. Those cases are State v.
Tehan, 190 N.J. Super. 348 (Law Div. 1982) and State v. Johnson, 203 N.J.
Super. 436 (Law Div. 1985). Each of these decisions comes to a different
conclusion.
Absent an appellate court's
determination on point, a trial court is not bound to follow the holding of
another trial court. Lackovic v. New England Paper Tube Co. 127 N.J. Super. 394
(App.Div. 1974). The State takes the position that State v. Tehan, supra,
should be the controlling case for this Court's determination. In Tehan the
trial court found that a person who operates a bicycle while intoxicated could
be properly convicted under the motor vehicle drunk driving statute, N.J.S.A.
39:4-50, by virtue of the statute defining rights and duties of persons on
bicycles. N.J.S.A. 39:4-14.1. The Tehan Court further held that although the
penalty of license revocation was inapplicable since bicycling was not a
licensed activity, other penalties such as fines, community service and
incarceration, set out in the drunk driving statute, could be imposed.
The defendant, on the other
hand, relies on State v. Johnson, supra. In that case the trial court refused
to follow the Tehan decision, absent legislative authority. The Court in
Johnson held that a defendant could not be convicted of operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol for operating a non-motorized
pedal-type bicycle while intoxicated. In coming to this conclusion, the Court
"scrutinized the detailed and technical definitions applicable to vehicles
of all classes and found it to be clearly apparent from the plain language of
the statute that muscular powered bicycles were not to be included" within
the purview of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. Id. at 439.
*282 The Court went on to
note that "it is not the role of the judiciary to extend the language of a
statute beyond that which has been legislated." Id. at 441; State v.
Leonardo, 109 N.J. Super. 442 (App.Div. 1970); Newark Firemen's Mutual
Benevolent Assoc. v. City of Newark, 90 N.J. 44 (1982). The Court concluded by
stating that "If it is the intention of the Legislature that a bicycle be
included as a motor vehicle and its operator subject to penalties for driving
while intoxicated, then it is also the responsibility of the Legislature to
make that clear." Id. 109 N.J. Super. at 442.
This Court is mindful of
the inherent dangers that are posed when a person operates a motor vehicle or a
bicycle on a public roadway while intoxicated. However, this Court concurs with
the decision in State v. Johnson, supra, in finding that there is no statutory
authority to convict the defendant for violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. That
statute specifically and unambiguously applies to motorized vehicles only. This
is evidenced by the definitions set forth under N.J.S.A. 39:1-1. For example,
the term "motor vehicle" is defined as "all vehicles propelled
otherwise than by muscular power ..." Likewise, the term
"vehicle" is defined to mean "every device in, upon or by which
a person or property is or may be transported upon a highway, excepting devices
moved by human power ..." Other definitions which support this Court's
conclusion that non-motorized bicycles were not intended by the Legislature to
fall within the ambit of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 include the term
"motorcycle" defined to include "motorcycles, motor bikes,
bicycles with motors attached and all motor-operated vehicles of the bicycle or
tricycle type ..." and "motorized bicycle" defined as a pedal
bicycle having a motor.
It is abundantly clear to
this court that the pertinent definitions found within N.J.S.A. 39:1-1 and used
in the drunken driving statute were not intended to apply to non-motorized
pedal-type bicycles. This court has no statutory authority to give greater
effect to a statute than that which its language *283 requires. Belfer v.
Borrella, 9 N.J. Super. 287 (App.Div. 1950). Nor should a court extend a
statute to include persons not intended. Belfer, supra at 293.
This Court further concurs
with the decision in State v. Johnson, supra, in finding that the defendant
cannot be convicted under the drunk driving statute by virtue of N.J.S.A.
39:4-14.1. The condemned act must be plainly and unmistakably within the statute
and any doubt as to the meaning of the statute must be resolved in favor of the
defendant. State v. Wean, 86 N.J. Super. 283 (App.Div. 1965). It is the
Legislature's function, not the Court's, to expand the scope of the Statute
beyond the plainly expressed legislative intent. The legislative intent is to
be discerned from the language of the Statute and Courts "cannot
arbitrarily expand its scope beyond the plainly expressed legislative
intent." State v. Wean, supra at 289, citing Dacunzo v. Edgye, 19 N.J.
443, 451 (1955).
Since it is the opinion of this court that
N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 is inapplicable to bicyclists, defendant's conviction must be
reversed.
