2053 Woodbridge Ave. Edison, NJ 08817

Ken is a NJ trial attorney who has published 130 articles in national and New Jersey publications on litigation topics. He has been selected to write the new ABA book: DUI and Drug Possession Defense".

Monday, May 08, 2017

NJ DWI Statute 2017

NJ DWI Statute 2017 
39:4-50  Driving while intoxicated
39:4-50. (a) Except as provided in subsection (g) of this section, a person who operates a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug, or operates a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08% or more by weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood or permits another person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug to operate a motor vehicle owned by him or in his custody or control or permits another to operate a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08% or more by weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood shall be subject:

(1)For the first offense:

(i)if the person's blood alcohol concentration is 0.08% or higher but less than 0.10%, or the person operates a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, or the person permits another person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor to operate a motor vehicle owned by him or in his custody or control or permits another person with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08% or higher but less than 0.10% to operate a motor vehicle, to a fine of not less than $250 nor more than $400 and a period of detainment of not less than 12 hours nor more than 48 hours spent during two consecutive days of not less than six hours each day and served as prescribed by the program requirements of the Intoxicated Driver Resource Centers established under subsection (f) of this section and, in the discretion of the court, a term of imprisonment of not more than 30 days and shall forthwith forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for a period of three months;

(ii)if the person's blood alcohol concentration is 0.10% or higher, or the person operates a motor vehicle while under the influence of narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug, or the person permits another person who is under the influence of narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug to operate a motor vehicle owned by him or in his custody or control, or permits another person with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10% or more to operate a motor vehicle, to a fine of not less than $300 nor more than $500 and a period of detainment of not less than 12 hours nor more than 48 hours spent during two consecutive days of not less than six hours each day and served as prescribed by the program requirements of the Intoxicated Driver Resource Centers established under subsection (f) of this section and, in the discretion of the court, a term of imprisonment of not more than 30 days and shall forthwith forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for a period of not less than seven months nor more than one year;

(iii)For a first offense, a person also shall be subject to the provisions of P.L.1999, c.417 (C.39:4-50.16 et al.).

(2)For a second violation, a person shall be subject to a fine of not less than $500 nor more than $1,000, and shall be ordered by the court to perform community service for a period of 30 days, which shall be of such form and on such terms as the court shall deem appropriate under the circumstances, and shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of not less than 48 consecutive hours, which shall not be suspended or served on probation, nor more than 90 days, and shall forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for a period of two years upon conviction, and, after the expiration of said period, he may make application to the Chief Administrator of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission for a license to operate a motor vehicle, which application may be granted at the discretion of the chief administrator, consistent with subsection (b) of this section.  For a second violation, a person also shall be required to install an ignition interlock device under the provisions of P.L.1999, c.417 (C.39:4-50.16 et al.).

(3)For a third or subsequent violation, a person shall be subject to a fine of $1,000, and shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of not less than 180 days in a county jail or workhouse, except that the court may lower such term for each day, not exceeding 90 days, served participating in a drug or alcohol inpatient rehabilitation program approved by the Intoxicated Driver Resource Center and shall thereafter forfeit his right to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this State for 10 years.  For a third or subsequent violation, a person also shall be required to install an ignition interlock device under the provisions of P.L.1999, c.417 (C.39:4-50.16 et al.).

As used in this section, the phrase "narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug" includes an inhalant or other substance containing a chemical capable of releasing any toxic vapors or fumes for the purpose of inducing a condition of intoxication, such as any glue, cement or any other substance containing one or more of the following chemical compounds: acetone and acetate, amyl nitrite or amyl nitrate or their isomers, benzene, butyl alcohol, butyl nitrite, butyl nitrate or their isomers, ethyl acetate, ethyl alcohol, ethyl nitrite or ethyl nitrate, ethylene dichloride, isobutyl alcohol or isopropyl alcohol, methyl alcohol, methyl ethyl ketone, nitrous oxide, n-propyl alcohol, pentachlorophenol, petroleum ether, propyl nitrite or propyl nitrate or their isomers, toluene, toluol or xylene or any other chemical substance capable of causing a condition of intoxication, inebriation, excitement, stupefaction or the dulling of the brain or nervous system as a result of the inhalation of the fumes or vapors of such chemical substance.

Whenever an operator of a motor vehicle has been involved in an accident resulting in death, bodily injury or property damage, a police officer shall consider that fact along with all other facts and circumstances in determining whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that person was operating a motor vehicle in violation of this section.

A conviction of a violation of a law of a substantially similar nature in another jurisdiction, regardless of whether that jurisdiction is a signatory to the Interstate Driver License Compact pursuant to P.L.1966, c.73 (C.39:5D-1 et seq.), shall constitute a prior conviction under this subsection unless the defendant can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the conviction in the other jurisdiction was based exclusively upon a violation of a proscribed blood alcohol concentration of less than 0.08%.

If the driving privilege of any person is under revocation or suspension for a violation of any provision of this Title or Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes at the time of any conviction for a violation of this section, the revocation or suspension period imposed shall commence as of the date of termination of the existing revocation or suspension period.  In the case of any person who at the time of the imposition of sentence is less than 17 years of age, the forfeiture, suspension or revocation of the driving privilege imposed by the court under this section shall commence immediately, run through the offender's seventeenth birthday and continue from that date for the period set by the court pursuant to paragraphs (1) through (3) of this subsection.  A court that imposes a term of imprisonment for a first or second offense under this section may sentence the person so convicted to the county jail, to the workhouse of the county wherein the offense was committed, to an inpatient rehabilitation program or to an Intoxicated Driver Resource Center or other facility approved by the chief of the Intoxicated Driving Program Unit in the Department of Health.  For a third or subsequent offense a person shall not serve a term of imprisonment at an Intoxicated Driver Resource Center as provided in subsection (f).

A person who has been convicted of a previous violation of this section need not be charged as a second or subsequent offender in the complaint made against him in order to render him liable to the punishment imposed by this section on a second or subsequent offender, but if the second offense occurs more than 10 years after the first offense, the court shall treat the second conviction as a first offense for sentencing purposes and if a third offense occurs more than 10 years after the second offense, the court shall treat the third conviction as a second offense for sentencing purposes.

(b)A person convicted under this section must satisfy the screening, evaluation, referral, program and fee requirements of the Division of Mental Health and Addiction Services' Intoxicated Driving Program Unit, and of the Intoxicated Driver Resource Centers and a program of alcohol and drug education and highway safety, as prescribed by the chief administrator.  The sentencing court shall inform the person convicted that failure to satisfy such requirements shall result in a mandatory two-day term of imprisonment in a county jail and a driver license revocation or suspension and continuation of revocation or suspension until such requirements are satisfied, unless stayed by court order in accordance with the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey, or R.S.39:5-22.  Upon sentencing, the court shall forward to the Division of Mental Health and Addiction Services' Intoxicated Driving Program Unit a copy of a person's conviction record.  A fee of $100 shall be payable to the Alcohol Education, Rehabilitation and Enforcement Fund established pursuant to section 3 of P.L.1983, c.531 (C.26:2B-32) to support the Intoxicated Driving Program Unit.

(c)Upon conviction of a violation of this section, the court shall collect forthwith the New Jersey driver's license or licenses of the person so convicted and forward such license or licenses to the chief administrator.  The court shall inform the person convicted that if he is convicted of personally operating a motor vehicle during the period of license suspension imposed pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, he shall, upon conviction, be subject to the penalties established in R.S.39:3-40. The person convicted shall be informed orally and in writing.  A person shall be required to acknowledge receipt of that written notice in writing. Failure to receive a written notice or failure to acknowledge in writing the receipt of a written notice shall not be a defense to a subsequent charge of a violation of R.S.39:3-40.  In the event that a person convicted under this section is the holder of any out-of-State driver's license, the court shall not collect the license but shall notify forthwith the chief administrator, who shall, in turn, notify appropriate officials in the licensing jurisdiction.  The court shall, however, revoke the nonresident's driving privilege to operate a motor vehicle in this State, in accordance with this section.  Upon conviction of a violation of this section, the court shall notify the person convicted, orally and in writing, of the penalties for a second, third or subsequent violation of this section.  A person shall be required to acknowledge receipt of that written notice in writing. Failure to receive a written notice or failure to acknowledge in writing the receipt of a written notice shall not be a defense to a subsequent charge of a violation of this section.

(d)The chief administrator shall promulgate rules and regulations pursuant to the "Administrative Procedure Act," P.L.1968, c.410 (C.52:14B-1 et seq.) in order to establish a program of alcohol education and highway safety, as prescribed by this act.

(e)Any person accused of a violation of this section who is liable to punishment imposed by this section as a second or subsequent offender shall be entitled to the same rights of discovery as allowed defendants pursuant to the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey.

(f)The counties, in cooperation with the Division of Mental Health and Addiction Services and the commission, but subject to the approval of the Division of Mental Health and Addiction Services, shall designate and establish on a county or regional basis Intoxicated Driver Resource Centers.  These centers shall have the capability of serving as community treatment referral centers and as court monitors of a person's compliance with the ordered treatment, service alternative or community service.  All centers established pursuant to this subsection shall be administered by a counselor certified by the Alcohol and Drug Counselor Certification Board of New Jersey or other professional with a minimum of five years' experience in the treatment of alcoholism.  All centers shall be required to develop individualized treatment plans for all persons attending the centers; provided that the duration of any ordered treatment or referral shall not exceed one year.  It shall be the center's responsibility to establish networks with the community alcohol and drug education, treatment and rehabilitation resources and to receive monthly reports from the referral agencies regarding a person's participation and compliance with the program.  Nothing in this subsection shall bar these centers from developing their own education and treatment programs; provided that they are approved by the Division of Mental Health and Addiction Services.

Upon a person's failure to report to the initial screening or any subsequent ordered referral, the Intoxicated Driver Resource Center shall promptly notify the sentencing court of the person's failure to comply.

Required detention periods at the Intoxicated Driver Resource Centers shall be determined according to the individual treatment classification assigned by the Intoxicated Driving Program Unit. Upon attendance at an Intoxicated Driver Resource Center, a person shall be required to pay a per diem fee of $75 for the first offender program or a per diem fee of $100 for the second offender program, as appropriate.  Any increases in the per diem fees after the first full year shall be determined pursuant to rules and regulations adopted by the Commissioner of Health in consultation with the Governor's Council on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse pursuant to the "Administrative Procedure Act," P.L.1968, c.410 (C.52:14B-1 et seq.).

The centers shall conduct a program of alcohol and drug education and highway safety, as prescribed by the chief administrator.

The Commissioner of Health shall adopt rules and regulations pursuant to the "Administrative Procedure Act," P.L.1968, c.410 (C.52:14B-1 et seq.), in order to effectuate the purposes of this subsection.

(g)When a violation of this section occurs while:

(1)on any school property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board, or within 1,000 feet of such school property;

(2)driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 if the municipality, by ordinance or resolution, has designated the school crossing as such; or

(3)driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 knowing that juveniles are present if the municipality has not designated the school crossing as such by ordinance or resolution, the convicted person shall: for a first offense, be fined not less than $500 or more than $800, be imprisoned for not more than 60 days and have his license to operate a motor vehicle suspended for a period of not less than one year or more than two years; for a second offense, be fined not less than $1,000 or more than $2,000, perform community service for a period of 60 days, be imprisoned for not less than 96 consecutive hours, which shall not be suspended or served on probation, nor more than 180 days, except that the court may lower such term for each day, not exceeding 90 days, served performing community service in such form and on such terms as the court shall deem appropriate under the circumstances and have his license to operate a motor vehicle suspended for a period of four years; and, for a third offense, be fined $2,000, imprisoned for 180 days in a county jail or workhouse, except that the court may lower such term for each day, not exceeding 90 days, served participating in a drug or alcohol inpatient rehabilitation program approved by the Intoxicated Driver Resource Center, and have his license to operate a motor vehicle suspended for a period of 20 years; the period of license suspension shall commence upon the completion of any prison sentence imposed upon that person.

A map or true copy of a map depicting the location and boundaries of the area on or within 1,000 feet of any property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board produced pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1987, c.101 (C.2C:35-7) may be used in a prosecution under paragraph (1) of this subsection.

It shall not be relevant to the imposition of sentence pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection that the defendant was unaware that the prohibited conduct took place while on or within 1,000 feet of any school property or while driving through a school crossing.  Nor shall it be relevant to the imposition of sentence that no juveniles were present on the school property or crossing zone at the time of the offense or that the school was not in session.

(h)A court also may order a person convicted pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, to participate in a supervised visitation program as either a condition of probation or a form of community service, giving preference to those who were under the age of 21 at the time of the offense.  Prior to ordering a person to participate in such a program, the court may consult with any person who may provide useful information on the defendant's physical, emotional and mental suitability for the visit to ensure that it will not cause any injury to the defendant.  The court also may order that the defendant participate in a counseling session under the supervision of the Intoxicated Driving Program Unit prior to participating in the supervised visitation program.  The supervised visitation program shall be at one or more of the following facilities which have agreed to participate in the program under the supervision of the facility's personnel and the probation department:

(1)a trauma center, critical care center or acute care hospital having basic emergency services, which receives victims of motor vehicle accidents for the purpose of observing appropriate victims of drunk drivers and victims who are, themselves, drunk drivers;

(2)a facility which cares for advanced alcoholics or drug abusers, to observe persons in the advanced stages of alcoholism or drug abuse; or

(3)if approved by a county medical examiner, the office of the county medical examiner or a public morgue to observe appropriate victims of vehicle accidents involving drunk drivers.

As used in this section, "appropriate victim" means a victim whose condition is determined by the facility's supervisory personnel and the probation officer to be appropriate for demonstrating the results of accidents involving drunk drivers without being unnecessarily gruesome or traumatic to the defendant.

If at any time before or during a visitation the facility's supervisory personnel and the probation officer determine that the visitation may be or is traumatic or otherwise inappropriate for that defendant, the visitation shall be terminated without prejudice to the defendant.  The program may include a personal conference after the visitation, which may include the sentencing judge or the judge who coordinates the program for the court, the defendant, defendant's counsel, and, if available, the defendant's parents to discuss the visitation and its effect on the defendant's future conduct.  If a personal conference is not practicable because of the defendant's absence from the jurisdiction, conflicting time schedules, or any other reason, the court shall require the defendant to submit a written report concerning the visitation experience and its impact on the defendant.  The county, a court, any facility visited pursuant to the program, any agents, employees, or independent contractors of the court, county, or facility visited pursuant to the program, and any person supervising a defendant during the visitation, are not liable for any civil damages resulting from injury to the defendant, or for civil damages associated with the visitation which are caused by the defendant, except for willful or grossly negligent acts intended to, or reasonably expected to result in, that injury or damage.

The Supreme Court may adopt court rules or directives to effectuate the purposes of this subsection.

(i)In addition to any other fine, fee, or other charge imposed pursuant to law, the court shall assess a person convicted of a violation of the provisions of this section a surcharge of $125, of which amount $50 shall be payable to the municipality in which the conviction was obtained, $50 shall be payable to the Treasurer of the State of New Jersey for deposit into the General Fund, and $25 which shall be payable as follows: in a matter where the summons was issued by a municipality's law enforcement agency, to that municipality to be used for the cost of equipping police vehicles with mobile video recording systems pursuant to the provisions of section 1 of P.L.2014, c.54 (C.40A:14-118.1); in a matter where the summons was issued by a county's law enforcement agency, to that county; and in a matter where the summons was issued by a State law enforcement agency, to the General Fund.


amended 1952, c.286; 1964, c.137; 1965, c.134; 1966, c.141, s.1; 1971, c.103; 1977, c.29, s.1; 1981, c.47, s.1; 1981, c.537, s.1; 1982, c.53, s.2; 1982, c.58, s.1; 1983, c.90, s.2; 1983, c.129, s.1; 1983, c.444, ss.1,3, (s.3 eff. date amended 1984, c.4, s.2); 1984, c.243, s.1; 1986, c.126; 1993, c.296, s.6; 1994, c.184, s.1; 1995, c.243; 1997, c.277, s.1; 1999, c.185, s.4; 1999, c.417, s.7; 2000, c.83, s.1; 2000, c.117; 2001, c.12; 2002, c.34, s.17; 2003, c.314, s.2; 2003, c.315, s.2; 2004, c.8, s.2; 2009, c.201, s.1; 2014, c.54, s.2.
 

Thursday, April 27, 2017

Marketing and Ethics in Your Practice
 Wednesday, May 17 - 10:00-11:40 a.m. Borgata Atlantic City NJSBA Annual Meeting


Wednesday, May 17 - 10:00-11:40 a.m. Borgata Atlantic City
NJSBA Annual Meeting
    Learn how to make more money by ethically marketing your practice... and staying ethically compliant. This program will demonstrate proven techniques for promoting your practice while staying within the ethics rules whether you handle cases in Municipal Court or in other areas of law.  Topics include: the ethics of marketing; ethical websites; ethical considerations of social networking; ethical considerations of in-person networking; and blogs, event calendars, articles and other types of promotion - some proven techniques for marketing and rainmaking that go beyond the conventional but stay within the ethics boundaries. ...and more.

Moderator/Speaker:
Kenneth A. Vercammen, Esq.
Law Office of Kenneth Vercammen & Associates, PC, Edison
Speaker:
Marc D. Garfinkle, Esq.
Office of Mark D. Garfinkle, Morristown
Jason T. Komninos, Esq.
Law Office of Jason T. Komninos, Hackensack
Shanna McCann, Esq.
Chance & McCann, LLC, Woodstown
 Borgata
1 Borgata Way, Atlantic City, NJ 08401

https://www.facebook.com/events/797157903765402


   Learn how to make more money by ethically marketing your practice... and staying ethically compliant!

  Proven techniques for promoting your practice while staying within the ethics rules, even if you handle cases other than Municipal Court.
Ethics in Municipal Court

       Learn everything you need to know to ethically promote your practice, including:

• An overview of the ethics of marketing - a discussion of information that is and is not permitted to be communicated to potential clients. An overview of relevant RPC’s , ethics opinions and cases that refer to ethical communication with potential clients, including Opinion 39, 42 and 43 and RPC 7.1.

• Ethical websites - do’s and dont’s as to how your website can attract the most clients while staying within the ethics rules. Topics will include imagery, testimonials and design.

• The Ethical Considerations of Social Networking - a focus on how to ethically grow your practice through on-line networking.

• The Ethical Considerations of In-Person Networking - This will review what you can and can’t say in person, conflicts of interest and more.


• Blogs, Event Calendars, Articles and Other Types of Promotion - Some proven techniques for marketing and rainmaking that go beyond the conventional but stay within the ethics boundaries.
...and more!

Sunday, April 23, 2017

Pending before NJ Supreme Court A-41-16 State v. Shayna Zalcberg (078308) In this DWI matter, is defendant entitled to the suppression of blood evidence obtained without a warrant?

Pending before NJ Supreme Court A-41-16  State v. Shayna Zalcberg (078308)
In this DWI matter, is defendant entitled to the suppression of blood evidence obtained without a warrant?
Leave to appeal granted:  3/9/17
Posted:  3/10/17
 
 NJ Advance Media for NJ.com previously wrote:http://www.nj.com/monmouth/index.ssf/2016/08/cops_waited_too_long_to_take_blood_sample_in_fatal.html
By MaryAnn Spoto | NJ Advance Media for NJ.com 

on August 29, 2016 at 5:52 PM, updated August 29, 2016 at 7:12 PM
FREEHOLD -- Prosecutors can't use the results of a blood test against a Rhode Island woman accused of killing one of her passengers while allegedly driving drunk in Freehold Township because police waited too long to get the sample, an appellate court panel said Monday.
The two-judge panel said they were throwing out the blood test evidence against Shayna Zalcberg because Freehold Township police needed a warrant to take blood from her after a fatal crash on Throckmorton Street on July 27, 2011.
Zalcberg, who was 28 at the time, was charged with vehicular homicide, two counts of third-degree vehicular assault, and one count of fourth-degree vehicular assault in the crash that killed Feliciano Colon, 36, of Freehold, one of her two passengers.
The court said that while some cases have circumstances allowing investigators to seek blood samples without a warrant, this was not one of them.
"On this record, the judge correctly concluded that the state failed to meet its burden to establish exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless blood draw," the ruling said.
Freehold Township police said that as a matter of routine after all cases of suspected drunk drivers, they didn't seek a warrant to take the blood sample because they didn't believe they needed one.
When Zalcberg's attorneys sought to have the blood test results dismissed, attorneys from the Monmouth County Prosecutor's Office argued a warrant wasn't necessary because, in the interest of time, investigators needed to have the test done before alcohol levels dissipated in her body.
But Superior Court Judge Francis Vernoia in Freehold ruled - and the appellate panel agreed - that that wasn't enough of an urgent situation to justify bypassing obtaining a warrant, according to the ruling. Vernoia and appellate judges Marie Simonelli and Greta Gooden Brown noted that Freehold Township police officers waited an hour after deciding there was probable cause to seek the blood test before they actually went to Jersey Shore University Medical Center in Neptune to get the sample. It was nearly four hours after the crash by the time they got the sample, the ruling said.
This is the second time the case went to the appellate division. In the first round, an appellate panel agreed with the prosecutor's office but the state Supreme Court sent the case back to Vernoia for a hearing on the urgency. Vernoia concluded - and this appellate panel agreed - that prosecutors didn't provide any testimony about urgent circumstances other than the dissipation of alcohol in Zalberg's blood.

Sunday, April 02, 2017

Federal DWI in Sandy Hook NJ 18 U.S.C.A 13

Federal DWI in Sandy Hook NJ 18 U.S.C.A 13 Laws of States adopted for areas within Federal jurisdiction , including Sandy Hook and National Gateway, Gunnison Beach, Fort Dix, Fort McGuire, Picatinny Arsenal, Naval Station Earle Lakehurst Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst

         If charged with a dwi or drug offense at Sandy Hook, the case will be handled in the Federal Magistrate Court, currently in Newark at the Federal Courthouse.

DWI Federal 36 C.F.R. 4.23(a) Federal Parks, including Sandy Hook, NJ

DWI Federal 36 C.F.R. 4.23(a) Federal Parks, including Sandy Hook, NJ
TITLE 36 - PARKS, FORESTS, AND PUBLIC PROPERTY

CHAPTER I - NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

PART 4 - VEHICLES AND TRAFFIC SAFETY

4.23 - Operating under the influence of alcohol or drugs.

(a) Operating or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle is prohibited while: (1) Under the influence of alcohol, or a drug, or drugs, or any combination thereof, to a degree that renders the operator incapable of safe operation; or (2) The alcohol concentration in the operator's blood or breath is 0.08 grams or more of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood or 0.08 grams or more of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. Provided however, that if State law that applies to operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol establishes more restrictive limits of alcohol concentration in the operator's blood or breath, those limits supersede the limits specified in this paragraph.

(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this section also apply to an operator who is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or another drug.

(c) Tests. (1) At the request or direction of an authorized person who has probable cause to believe that an operator of a motor vehicle within a park area has violated a provision of paragraph (a) of this section, the operator shall submit to one or more tests of the blood, breath, saliva or urine for the purpose of determining blood alcohol and drug content.

(2) Refusal by an operator to submit to a test is prohibited and proof of refusal may be admissible in any related judicial proceeding.

(3) Any test or tests for the presence of alcohol and drugs shall be determined by and administered at the direction of an authorized person.

(4) Any test shall be conducted by using accepted scientific methods and equipment of proven accuracy and reliability operated by personnel certified in its use.

(d) Presumptive levels. (1) The results of chemical or other quantitative tests are intended to supplement the elements of probable cause used as the basis for the arrest of an operator charged with a violation of paragraph (a)(1) of this section. If the alcohol concentration in the operator's blood or breath at the time of testing is less than alcohol concentrations specified in paragraph (a)(2) of this section, this fact does not give rise to any presumption that the operator is or is not under the influence of alcohol.

(2) The provisions of paragraph (d)(1) of this section are not intended to limit the introduction of any other competent evidence bearing upon the question of whether the operator, at the time of the alleged violation, was under the influence of alcohol, or a drug, or drugs, or any combination thereof.

[52 FR 10683, Apr. 2, 1987, as amended at 68 FR 46479, Aug. 6, 2003]

(a) Whoever within or upon any of the places now existing or hereafter reserved or acquired as provided in section 7 of this title, or on, above, or below any portion of the territorial sea of the United States not within the jurisdiction of any State, Commonwealth, territory, possession, or district is guilty of any act or omission which, although not made punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be punishable if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of the State, Territory, Possession, or District in which such place is situated, by the laws thereof in force at the time of such act or omission, shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to a like punishment.
(b)
(1) Subject to paragraph (2) and for purposes of subsection (a) of this section, that which may or shall be imposed through judicial or administrative action under the law of a State, territory, possession, or district, for a conviction for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of a drug or alcohol, shall be considered to be a punishment provided by that law. Any limitation on the right or privilege to operate a motor vehicle imposed under this subsection shall apply only to the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
(2)
(A) In addition to any term of imprisonment provided for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of a drug or alcohol imposed under the law of a State, territory, possession, or district, the punishment for such an offense under this section shall include an additional term of imprisonment of not more than 1 year, or if serious bodily injury of a minor is caused, not more than 5 years, or if death of a minor is caused, not more than 10 years, and an additional fine under this title, or both, if—
(i) a minor (other than the offender) was present in the motor vehicle when the offense was committed; and
(ii) the law of the State, territory, possession, or district in which the offense occurred does not provide an additional term of imprisonment under the circumstances described in clause (i).
(B) For the purposes of subparagraph (A), the term “minor” means a person less than 18 years of age.
(c) Whenever any waters of the territorial sea of the United States lie outside the territory of any State, Commonwealth, territory, possession, or district, such waters (including the airspace above and the seabed and subsoil below, and artificial islands and fixed structures erected thereon) shall be deemed, for purposes of subsection (a), to lie within the area of the State, Commonwealth, territory, possession, or district that it would lie within if the boundaries of such State, Commonwealth, territory, possession, or district were extended seaward to the outer limit of the territorial sea of the United States.

Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13

The US Attorneys Office wrote the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13, makes state law applicable to conduct occurring on lands reserved or acquired by the Federal government as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 7(3), when the act or omission is not made punishable by an enactment of Congress.
Prosecutions instituted under this statute are not to enforce the laws of the state, but to enforce Federal law, the details of which, instead of being recited, are adopted by reference. In addition to minor violations, the statute has been invoked to cover a number of serious criminal offenses defined by state law such as burglary and embezzlement. However, the Assimilative Crimes Act cannot be used to override other Federal policies as expressed by acts of Congress or by valid administrative orders.
The prospective incorporation of state law was upheld in United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1957). State law is assimilated only when no "enactment of Congress" covers the conduct. The application of this rule is not always easy. In Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711, 717 (1946), prosecution of a sex offense under a state statute with a higher age of consent was held impermissible, but a conviction for a shooting with intent to kill as defined by state law was upheld, despite the similarity of provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 113. Fields v. United States, 438 F.2d 205 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 907 (1971); but see Hockenberry v. United States, 422 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1970). See also United States v. Bowers, 660 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1981) (child abuse); United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1978)(sodomy). There seems to be a definite trend to construe 18 U.S.C. § 13 liberally to provide complete coverage of criminal conduct within an enclave, even where the offense is generally covered by Federal law. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 967 F.2d 1431 (10th Cir. 1992)(aggravated assault); United States v. Griffith, 864 F.2d 421 (6th Cir. 1988)(reckless assault); United States v. Kaufman, 862 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1988)(assault); Fesler v. United States, 781 F.2d 384 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1118 (1986)(child abuse).
The Uniform Code of Military Justice (U.C.M.J.), 10 U.S.C. §  801 et seq., because of its unlimited applicability, is not considered an "enactment of Congress" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 13. See United States v. Walker, 552 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 848 (1977)(drunk driving). See also Franklin v. United States, 216 U.S. 559 (1910). Military personnel committing acts on an enclave subject to Federal jurisdiction which are not made an offense by Federal statutes other than the U.C.M.J. may therefore be prosecuted in district court for violations of state law assimilated by 18 U.S.C. § 13, even though they are also subject to court martial. However, dual prosecution, it should be noted, is constitutionally precluded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907).
Section 13 of Title 18 does not assimilate penal provisions of state regulatory schemes. See United States v. Marcyes, 557 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1977). Nor does it incorporate state administrative penalties, such as suspension of drivers licenses. See United States v. Rowe, 599 F.2d 1319 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1978). Section 13(b) allows suspension of licenses within the enclave.
Federal agency regulations, violations of which are made criminal by statute, have been held to preclude assimilation of state law. See United States v. Adams, 502 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.Fla. 1980)(carrying concealed weapon in federal courthouse); United States v. Woods, 450 F. Supp. 1335 (D.Md. 1978)(drunken driving on parkway). In Adams, 502 F. Supp. 21, the defendant was charged with carrying a concealed weapon in a United States Courthouse in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 13 and the pertinent Florida felony firearms statute. In dismissing the indictment, the Adams court concluded that a General Services Administration (GSA) petty offense weapons regulation (41 C.F.R. § 101-20.313), explicitly provided for by statute, 40 U.S.C. §  318a, amounted to an enactment of Congress within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §  13 and, therefore, the defendant could not be prosecuted by the assimilation of state law which prohibited the same precise act.
It is important to note, however, that a critical provision of the GSA regulations apparently was not considered in Adams. See 41 C.F.R. § 101-20.315 which provides in part:
Nothing in these rules and regulations shall be construed to abrogate any other Federal laws or regulations or any State and local laws and regulations applicable to any area in which the property is situated.
This non-abrogation provision arguably would permit the assimilation of appropriate state firearms laws or other state statutes notwithstanding the existence of the GSA regulations. It appears that this language has never been considered in any reported case. Moreover, no discussion of the meaning of this language appears in the pertinent parts of the Federal Register, 43 Fed.Reg. 29001, July 5, 1978; 41 Fed.Reg. 13378, March 30, 1976.
We believe it would be reasonable to interpret this non-abrogation provision as permitting the government, in its discretion, to proceed under 18 U.S.C. § 13 and appropriate state firearms laws, rather than under the GSA weapons regulation.


Source https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-610-deportations-expulsions-or-other-extraordinary-renditions